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Abstract 
This thesis looks into two specific topics regarding the relationship between bank 
lending and the economy. The first is about how non-performing loans (NPLs) 
are treated by individual banks, how their actions affect their viability, as well as 
its impact on the market for collateral. The objective is to provide insight into 
the decision-making process of a typical bank, and how decisions made from such 
a process impact on asset markets. The second topic relates to the transmission 
of monetary policy changes through variations in the volume of bank lending in 
Australia, with particular reference to the firms sector. Insight on this channel of 
transmission can contribute to the literature on how monetary policy is transmitted 
through the banking system and affects the wider economy. 
Chapter 2 explores the incentives that banks face when treating bad loans. 
Since vyrite offs frequently involve losses , capital adequacy requirements present a 
binding constraint on banks ' plans for liquidating bad loans. When bank safety is 
threatened, banks are forced to evergreen loans to bad customers and profitability 
is thus reduced. It is demonstrated that lowering regulatory capital requirements 
can ease this constraint and allow more liquidation of bad loans when liquidation 
is desirable. 
Chapter 3 investigates the effects on the asset market of bank actions in dealing 
with their NPLs , by extending the model in Chapter 2 to inGlude interactions with 
the market for collateral. Results show that liquidation of bad loans may not be 
as detrimental to asset prices as commonly argued, because funds recouped from 
liquidation can be recycled into new loans which support the asset market. While 
lV 
capital regulation protects the bank health, it may sometimes limit the amount of 
liquidation and hence reduce the impact of the 'recycling channel' . This supports 
the idea that varying capital requirements countercyclically can dampen the eco-
nomic cycle, notwithstanding the potential problems with making this a tool for 
economic management. Additionally, this chapter finds a distinction between two 
types of forbearance, that based on bank profit maximisation, and from concerns 
over a bank's financial health. 
Chapter 4 makes use of aggregate time series data in Australia to look into the 
strength of the bank lending channel of monetary policy. Investigation is done by 
examining whether monetary aggregates affect the spread between bank loan rates 
and bond rates. Results indicate that for small firms , the strength of the channel is 
dependent negatively on the size of the real deposit base. This is because deposits 
represent the supply of bank loans which if increased lowers bank lending rates. 
For large firms a different mechanism operates suggesting red11ced influence of the 
channel, shown by larger loan volumes coinciding with a narrowing spread, implying 
that banks prefer to concentrate on lending to larger businesses. Rises in foreign 
funding coincide with a widening spread, but after a lag they also help to reduce 
upward pressure on loan rates , suggesting a weakening of the channel as foreign 
funding rises to relieve pressure on the market for bank loans. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis studies two main problen1s related to the day-to-day operations of a typ-
ical bank by focussing on how bank lending can potentially influence the economy. 
Specifically, the first topic of interest is on the way non-performing loans (NPLs) 
are treated in the banking system, how bank action on these loans will impact on 
the economy through affecting the health of the banks themselves , and also the 
amount of bank loans supplied as a result. Second, the effect in Australia exerted 
by the volume of bank loans and foreign funds in transmitting monetary policy, 
and how firms of different sizes fare in obtaining funds , are examined. The three 
chapters that follow will investigate, respectively, how banks deal with the NPLs 
that arise typically as a result of struggling borrowers defaulting on loan payments; 
how these decisions impact on banks themselves and their interaction with collat-
eral markets; and the degree to which monetary policy in Australia impacts on the 
economy through affecting the supply of bank loans. 
Even though NPLs occur in all economic climates , they are much more prevalent 
in times of economic distress , and the media frowns on banks when foreclosure of 
loans start to threaten homeowners and small businesses. This is so because of 
the belief that other segments of society are so reliant on bank lending to continue 
their normal activities. Ever since the global financial crisis broke out in 2007, 
to this day there are periodic reports of high-level debates on how banks can play 
an important role in intermediating credit that is so scarce for so n1any sectors of 
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the economy. Identifying the strength of the bank lending channel through which 
monetary policy is transmitted is an important topic as it informs policymakers 
about the efficacy of manoeuvring the policy interest rate. It is important to see 
what factors can affect monetary policy, one of two main policy levers available to 
authorities, through influencing the volume of bank loans. 
The reason why the question of NPLs attracts much attention from the media 
and other sections of society is because they are frequently viewed as the main 
cause of problems that threaten to hinder the subsequent recovery of the economy. 
The experiences of the Great Depression in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s 
provide fertile ground for opinions from opposing sides of the spectrum. While 
some advocate faster disposal of bad loans, others suggest a slower pace would be 
better for the economy. An extreme supporter of the faster clean up approach was 
Andrew Mellon, US Secretary of the Treasury during the Great Depression, whose 
advice in 1931 was to: 1 
Liquidate labor , liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers , liquidate real 
estate. It will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of 
living and high living will come down .... Values will be adjusted, and 
enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people. 
This point of view is primarily based on the premise that producers that have 
ended up in trouble tend not to be dynamic enough to revive an economy. Hence 
it is better to have troubled firms shut down, and banks can then move on to 
make loans to new firn1s that shall help the economy recover. During the Asian 
financial crisis in 1998, the IMF has been arguing for a quick resolution of NPLs by 
asking countries to set up asset management companies and inject public money 
into banks to fund massive write-offs. There are other co1nmentators representing 
the industries who also seek an early end to the NPLs problem, see for example 
Wallison (2002). This opinion is echoed in the academic world by such authors as 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi , and Kashyap (2006). 
1 Hoover (1953). 
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At the other end of the spectrum, there are those that are concerned with the 
damage that quick liquidation can do to the economy, and hence argue for moder-
ation in clearing the NPLs. For example, in a series of newspaper commentaries, 
Krugman argues that quick restructuring of the Japanese banking sector is not 
likely to achieve much. 2 In a similar vein, Koo (2003) applauds the actions of the 
Japanese government in tackling the NPLs problem slowly. The rationale behind 
this view is that any drastic action to clear the NPLs in the banking sector will not 
yield large and immediate benefits: the damage to banks will dominate and there-
fore the economy will be injured further. Included within some of these comments 
is the concern over added pressure on asset prices from firesales. These commenta-
tors generally favour policies that do not force the banks to write off large amounts 
of bad loans , such as demand side stimulus packages that try to revive the fortunes 
of the borrowers. 
Despite the apparent appeal of the arguments advanced by both camps, and 
heated debates over responses to NPLs problems, the actions of the banks them-
selves frequently do not conform to either desired ideal. For example, the Japanese 
NPLs problems persisted for a long time despite calls from the highest offices for a 
quick solution. 3 One reason may be that these opinions from outside the banking 
sector do not take account of banks ' private consideration, such as the institutional 
features within which banks operate, and are only concerned with macroeconomic 
and asset market stability.4 There is a need to investigate the banks ' private in-
centives to further understand why they may choose actions that do not conform 
to either ca1np. 
At the san1e time, arguments over how NPLs impact on asset prices are fre-
quently based solely on the one-sided observation that selling collateral into the 
market decreases its price, and therefore to clean bank balance sheets (whether by 
2 An example of this opinion is Krugman (2001). 
3 In 2002, then Prime Minister Koizumi named the NPL problem as a top priority issue and 
asked the Bank of Japan to take action to enhance "the prospects for an early resolution of the 
so-called 'non-performing loans problem'." See Japanese IVIinistry of Foreign Affairs (2002). 
4 See for exan1ple Nishimura and Kawamoto (2003) and Kocherlakota and Shim (2005). 
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banks ' own will or enforcement by authorities) during downturns will magnify neg-
ative wealth effects. Yet this action is almost certainly not the only thing banks do 
in disposing of their NPLs. For example, account must be given to the subsequent 
use of funds by the banks. The recouped funds can either be hoarded to boost 
the capital ratio , which enhances a bank's safety, or lent out to other firms. The 
activity created by the new lending, and its impact on asset prices, is frequently 
left out in debates over NPLs. An understanding of the overall impact of NPLs on 
asset markets is therefore necessary. 
The study in Chapter 2 looks at the incentives that a representative bank faces 
in dealing with its NPLs. The partial equilibrium model developed is simple in 
nature and takes profit maximisation as a working assumption of a typical bank. 
When deciding on a course of action on delinquent loans, the bank makes a decision 
over expected profit of continuing with the current borrower, or to call in the loan 
and lend out the funds to someone else. The other major cop_cern for this bank 
is the loss that comes with writing off bad loans threatening its stability. Since 
meeting the 1ninimum capital adequacy ratio is a universal requirement for banks 
and a restraint on their financial position, the bank must also take this into account. 
Accordingly, the approach taken to analyse how this concern interacts with disposal 
of NPLs is to examine the changes in bank balance sheets brought about by writing 
off delinquent loans , and how bank behaviour is restrained by these changes. 
A peculiar yet not uncommon practice of commercial banks regarding treatment 
of NPLs is embedded in the model presented here. While there are guidelines in 
the Basel Committee documents and national regulations , sometimes banks take to 
creative accounting measures to either conceal or 'dress up ' delinquent loans. This 
thesis considers explicitly the behaviour of some banks which do not recognise their 
bad loans on the balance sheets. This was a common occurence in the 1990s in 
Japan. As such, their capital ratios were arbitrarily inflated, and did not fall foul 
of regulators. 5 This kind of practice is closely related to the slightly more complex 
51n fact , they were sometimes implicitly allowed by authorities , since strict enforcement would 
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practice of 'evergreening', where delinquent loans attract new loans from banks 
equal to their unpaid interest. The firms then pay it straight back to the banks 
so that the interest payments appear current and the loan is not non-performing, 
at the cost of an ever growing principal. 6 The net result is also to give banks the 
appearance of satisfying capital regulation. When practiced in today's world, with 
mark-to-market regulations in place, these techniques potentially give banks even 
more of an advantage because otherwise the bad loans not only attract a capital 
charge under Basel regulations, marking down the values of loans classified as bad 
also leads to a direct decline in profit, which further reduces the capital ratio. In 
such cases banking authorities must stand ready to inject large amounts of funds 
into banks when NPLs occur on a substantial scale. A case in point is the current 
trouble some banks are having with Greek debt. 
The contribution this thesis makes to the topic of NPLs is to analyse how banks 
treat their impaired loans when profitability interacts with capital regulation. The 
abovementioned techniques of concealment are expressly pitched at avoiding con-
travention of minimum capital adequacy. Since in theory no bank can have less 
capital than the regulated standard, choosing an ideal level of NPLs tolerance be-
comes more complicated than simple profit maximisation. It is shown that because 
of capital regulation, sometimes banks are forced to engage in two different types of 
forbearance - one as a result of risk taking for profit , the other to avoid writing off 
bad loans so that the capital ratio does not drop. These actions are quite different 
to either opinion over the speed of NPLs clearance described above. 
In reality, the analysis is complicated by a number of other regulatory require-
ments , such as rules for making provisions for specific contingencies, and limits on 
lending imposed by national authorities, but only the obligatory capital requirement 
is considered to show how a bank deals with this kind of regulation in a represen-
tative way. Capital adequacy requirements are included in the analysis because 
push many banks into trouble and induce systemic instability. 
6 See Peek and Rosengren (2005) for more details on evergreening. 
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most commercial banks in the world must observe a (more or less) universal set of 
guidelines, as set out in principle by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
Rules on bad loan provisions are frequently based on national accounting standards 
and company legislation, as are rules on whether banks are allowed to deal with 
borrowers in a manner other than at arm's-length. Including these factors will 
cloud the clarity of the implications for a representative bank. To keep the model 
simple and the implications clear, other financing decisions, such as the issuance of 
convertible debt or shareholder capital are also kept out of the model. By doing 
so, this chapter provides clear insight into the most basic incentives of a bank, that 
is , how their decisions on NPLs impact on their financial positions, and why some 
banks may choose to slow down the process of dealing with NPLs. 
Since most bank loans are secured by collateral, the disposal of bad loans neces-
sarily involves the repossession and sale of such assets. In Chapter 3, the analysis is 
extended to look also at the market for assets. As the incidenc_e of NPLs increases 
in times of downturn, some commentators, such as Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang 
(2006), opine that liquidating bad loans and selling collateral must be detrimental 
to the economy, as it applies further downward pressure to the prices of such assets. 
This result is obtained without considering the other actions that banks take as 
they dispose of their bad loans. If the subsequent usage of funds recouped from 
the sale of collateral is included in the analysis, then the results are less obvious, 
since the new activity can potentially support asset prices. 
This chapter takes a look at this issue by applying the framework in Chapter 2 to 
include interactions with the market for collateral. Specifically, the model does not 
limit the interaction to a mechanical firesale of assets, but rather the subsequent 
usage of recovered funds is also included. At the same time, the application of 
capital regulation and its effects on collateral prices must also be investigated. This 
is important because the capital ratio imposes a lin1it on the amount of risky loans 
banks can give out , and this can have an impact on the sale of repossessed collateral 
and hence asset prices. The interaction between banks ' disposal of NPLs , its impact 
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on asset pnces , and the constraint imposed by capital regulation gives rise to a 
co1nplicated set of influences on how banks treat their bad loans. The model shows 
that if the costs of liquidating bad loans are not too great, then asset prices need not 
fall as new activity provides support to the market. There is also the possibility 
that banks may allow forbearance as a rational response. Such nuanced results 
serve to bring optimal bank behaviour further away from the two extreme opinions 
mentioned above, and also raises the question of whether capital regulation, as 
the only thing that policymakers can control in this environment, can be used to 
manage the banking sector. 
Central banks in some industrialised countries have in the last few years en-
gaged in policies beyond normal manipulation of official interest rates to ease the 
problems with the banking sector. These actions range from capital injection into 
some banks , to accepting a larger range of bank assets as collateral. The imple-
mentation of such policies is based on the belief that bank lending is an important 
component of economic activity, and that central bank policy is able to influence the 
banking sector. Regarding the relationship between bank lending and the trans-
mission of monetary policy, Bernanke and Gertler (1995; mention that the bank 
lending channel affects the economy through altering the amount of bank loans 
made available by banks. Prior to the 1980s, the Australian banking environment 
was generally conducive to the bank lending channel to exert a strong influence 
on how monetary policy was transmitted, because markets for alternative finance 
were not as well developed and there were more hurdles for participants to enter 
them. Since then, many changes have opened up the banking sector to outside 
influences. These changes include a process of deregulation, allowing banks to 
compete internationally, and in permitting banks to engage in more financing ac-
tivities both domestically and overseas. Innovations in financial markets have also 
led to the securitisation of erstwhile illiquid assets. These developments raise the 
question of whether the strength of the bank lending channel changes over time. 
The development of the Australian banking sector since the 1980s is explored in 
7 
Appendix F. 
Chapter 4 is an empirical study to measure the strength of the bank lending 
channel of monetary policy in Australia. The specific focus is on whether the 
n1onetary policy impulses are transmitted through influencing the supply of bank 
lending to firms, a class of borrowers supposedly better able to access market finance. 
The estimations in this chapter make use of macroeconomic time series data in 
Australia to investigate movements of the spread between bank lending and bond 
rates. Some studies of the bank lending channel, notably Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
make use of individual bank level balance sheet data to build a panel dataset , 
since banks of varying sizes and strength may respond to monetary impulses in 
different ways, and thus the borrowers from these heterogeneous banks are affected 
differently. This way, the problem of isolating supply side factors of bank loans 
using equilibrium bank loan volumes data is solved. However , since the Australian 
banking sector only has a small number of banks , assembling d~ta for such a panel 
is impracticable as there will not be enough datapoints with which to carry out 
estimations. Hence, macroeconomic data is used in a different estimation strategy. 
Because of the small number of banks that dominate the market for commercial 
lending in Australia, the individual behaviour of the few big banks is representative 
of the sector as a whole, so the use of aggregate data is loosely representative of 
activity by industry in general. The theoretical grounding of the model used is based 
on the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model , which can be used to see if the potency 
of the bank lending channel is driven by a number of banking sector aggregates 
through investigating variations in the spread between interest rates charged on 
bank loans and bonds. 
A separate contribution of this chapter is the addition of Australian evidence to 
the growing international literature on the bank lending channel. Many countries 
have had studies done on them, yet only Suzuki (2004) has offered any evidence 
on Australia. Suzuki 's finding that the bank lending channel does not dominate 
other channels of transmission does not allow a conclusion to be made about the 
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strength of this channel of transmission. This chapter adds extra information to 
the Australian case by providing evidence that large and small firms face different 
circumstances in obtaining bank loans , and in confirmation with Suzuki (2004) , 
foreign funding can reduce the effects of the bank lending channel. 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion to the thesis. 
9 
Chapter 2 
Bank Incentives in the Treatment 
of Non-Performing Loans 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to investigate the factors that influence a-bank's choice when 
treating non-performing loans (NPLs) on its books , centering on the decision over 
rollovers and liquidations. One of the most important things banks consider in 
any lending decision, and by extension in the treatment of NPLs, is how the future 
outlook of the economy will affect the expected productivity of its borrowers. The 
prospect of borrowers making adequate profit to make interest payments and repay 
the principal is an important consideration for a bank. However , economic outlook 
is not the only factor that determines a bank's response to bad debts. A bank's 
own health also features prominently in this process and it is manifested in the form 
of capital adequacy concerns. 
In the de bate over the treatment of bad loans , suggestions for the banking sector 
typically centre on how much funds banks should make available to new firms. Two 
opposing views have either called for zero tolerance of bad loans , which means banks 
should write them off as quickly as possible, or to allow delinquent borrowers the 
chance to repay their loans , by asking banks to tolerate the presence of bad loans on 
their books. For example, in Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2006), a suggestion 
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for stimulating the Japanese economy is to get banks to liquidate the loans of 
bad companies as quickly as possible, because this frees up much needed funds 
for new and competitive firms. In von Peter (2004) , analysis of banking sector 
intermediation and its effect on asset prices and the macroeconomy assumes NPLs 
produced by a negative shock to be written off immediately. 
The debate over the merits of these two extreme opinions have largely ignored 
the questions of interest that face banks. There is no consideration of whether 
banks may choose not to write them off instantly, and what effect that will have on 
the macroeconomy. While these comments may make good sense from a macroeco-
nomic point of view, and therefore appeal to policymakers and a variety of interest 
groups, in reality banks by no means only abide by suggestions made on the basis 
of macroeconomic prospects. Ultimately, commerical banks are companies aiming 
to make profits , and there is no obligation on them to put the health of the entire 
economy as first priority. There are a number of private concer11s that a bank must 
attend to. 
Two of the most important among them have to do_ with the viability of a 
bank. A bank's ultimate objective is to maximise profit, so it is natural that the 
profit motive features prominently in its decision making. Whether or not a bank 
chooses to forbear a bad loan may depend on the future prospects of the borrower. 
Another consideration is problems with capital adequacy when banks write off their 
bad loans. Bank capital is impaired when NPLs are revealed and written off, so in 
dealing with such loans a prime concern for banks and regulators is bank viability. 
When the damage threatens to bring a bank below capital adequacy requirements , 
it raises the possibility that it will engage in activities that maintain a healthy 
appearance on the balance sheet, contrary to ordinary for-profit behaviour. This 
point is investigated in a paper by Peek and Rosengren (2005). They study bank 
behaviour in Japan relating to the evergreening of bad loans , and find evidence that 
banks there engaged in forbearance as a measure to give their financial statements 
an arbitrarily healthy appearance. One of the more interesting points mentioned 
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in their paper is that throughout the 1990s not only did Japanese banks evergreen 
loans to non-performing debtors , in the process they also did not provision for delays 
in collection, pursuant to BIS guidelines. That means the reality of non-collection 
of funds is completely hidden from the balance sheets of banks. This is very notable 
because it is an attractive, albeit devious, way of hiding NPLs. In this study, this 
behaviour is explicitly included in the model, to see the implications that this has 
on bank behaviour. 
Potentially, asset prices are another important factor in a bank's consideration. 
This is because if banks decide to foreclose on borrowers and seize their collateral, 
the usual way to recoup funds is to sell this asset. While asset prices are low, selling 
may depress prices further and generate unsatisfactory liquidation receipts. This 
can have an adverse impact on bank balance sheets. But in trying to deal with the 
NP Ls that originate from declining asset prices , some commentators suggest that 
banks have limited options in that liquidation of delinquent borrowers will possibly 
only yield a very low return. 
There is a view counter to the above opinion regarding the effects bank fl.resales 
have on asset prices. There are question marks over whether the liquidation of 
part of a small con1petitive bank's portfolio of bad loans will really cause noticeable 
price n1ovements in the asset markets in themselves. It seems at least plausible 
that slumps in asset prices frequently observed in tandem with adverse economic 
shocks are not directly caused, or even exacerbated, by banks , as is the main premise 
behind Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang (2006). 
To illustrate the basic decision-making process of banks clearly, this chapter 
shall not include any interaction between banks and the collateral markets. Doing 
so allows one to see clearly how a bank's balance sheet is impacted by decisions on 
disposing of bad loans. The environment is then analogous to one that focusses on a 
world where small competitive banks conduct their treatment of NPLs without any 
endogenous effect from the asset market. The model demonstrates that NPLs can 
potentially harm the bank's capital position, such that when banks see a possibility 
12 
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that the damage is senous enough to affect their own stability, they must take 
special action to protect themselves. This may mean that at that stage banks do 
not choose actions that adhere to the normal modus operandi of profit maximisation 
any more. 
The next section illustrates the setup of the model. In Section 2.3, the choice of 
a bank facing this trade off is considered. Section 2.4 introduces capital regulation 
and how it affects a bank's actions. The implications that capital regulation raises 
for the health of banks are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Model 
2.2.1 Banks 
-
There is a continuum of identical banks in existence. Banks have a given amount 
of their own capital, some deposits and a portfolio of loans determined outside 
the model. Deposits pay no interest, as it does not play any significant role in 
the analysis. In period -1 , loans are given out to firms with identical two-period 
projects which produce output at the end of every period of operation. In period 
-1 , banks ' portfolios consist of loans to P firms with two-period identical projects , 
plus deposits and capital that amount to d and z respectively. Define the size of 
each loan to be of fixed value l for each firm. The balance sheet of a bank at the 
beginning of period O is given below: 
Balance sheet at start of period 0 
Cash d + z - Pl 
Receivables Pl 
d+ z 
Deposit 
Capital 
d 
z 
d+ z 
In period 0, banks observe a probability of success 1r in aggregate for these P 
projects producing output y1 > 0, otherwise y1 = 0, but neither the bank nor firm 
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knows whether a specific project will be successful or not while contracting. For 
regulatory purposes, a minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is set by banking 
authorities, and the capital ratio is observed at a certain level based on these prior 
activities. It is assumed that banks in this model will not engage in behaviour that 
intentionally breaches the CAR regulation. 
At this point, production outcomes are realised and a proportion 1 - 1r of firms, 
say N, randomly fail to produce anything. They are not able to pay their interest 
and these loans are defined as non-performing in this model. Banks have to decide 
whether to continue financing those projects or to liquidate them. The cash avail-
able from loan interest and liquidation proceeds will be lent out to finance other 
projects operated by new one-period firms at the end of the period. The capital 
ratio of the bank for this period is measured after all actions have been completed. 
Period O then ends. 
-
In period 1, all firms that have ongoing projects realise their output and banks 
collect interest plus principal. The model ends. 
2.2.2 Firms 
Each firm is endowed with some level of capital. There are two types of firms. 
Of the two types, P firms have ex-ante identical two-period projects already in 
operation while others have one-period projects ready to start in period 0. All firms 
each invest their endowment k into it and must borrow fro1n banks to purchase the 
necessary productive assets. They pledge their productive assets as collateral to 
the banks. The loan contracts last for the same number of periods as the duration 
of their projects. For the P two-period firms, their loan contracts require them to 
make two interest payments , i 0 now and i 1 plus principal in period 1.1 One period 
1 This model abstracts from issues of willingness to pay, by assuming that firms will pay back 
their loans if their project returns allow them to do so. See, for example, Hellwig (1977) and 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) for analyses of loan markets in which debtors may strategically choose 
not to repay. 
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firms pay their interest i 1 in period 1. Interest on the loans is paid after outputs 
are realised each period. The principal is repaid from output after projects are 
completed. 
In period 0, production outcomes are realised and N firms fail to produce. 
They are unable to pay interest, and to continue operating next period, they must 
ask banks to roll over their loans, promising to pay interest for both periods and 
principal in period 1. Those that are refused rollovers will shut down and exit the 
economy. Firms (performing or not) are assumed unable to liquidate their assets 
and close down strategically. 
For the P - N performing projects, they pay their interest promptly. Their 
returns for the next period are independent of the success of the current period. 
For simplicity, assume it has a probability 1r of producing y1 > 0 in period 1. 
2.2.3 Decision on liquidating NPLs 
Given the structure of the model, in period O banks must decide between staying 
with the delinquent firn1s and continue to finance them, or to liquidate them, sell 
their collateral, and lend the funds to new firms. To simplify matters, the model 
only allows banks to take one of two extreme positions: 2 
(1) Rollover the loans, in which case the projects continue. The bank collects 
nothing in period O and attempts to collect both interest payments plus principal 
next period. Non-performing projects operate at a reduced level of productivity, 
reflected in a lower probability of success e, 0 < e < 1r < 1. 
2 There is a spectrum of actions available for banks in between these two extremes. For example , 
rollovers can take the forn1 of debt restructuring, which may involve paying a smaller amount at 
a later date. Alternatively, liquidation can also be partial , in which case the banks do not close 
down the firn1 in trouble but rather seize only some of its assets. Analysing these in-between 
cases , however , introduces unnecessary algebra and does not enrich the qualitative results of the 
model. 
15 
(2) Liquidate the firms, in which case the banks recoup some funds by selling 
the seized collateral. That money is then used for alternative investment.3 Similar 
-
to existing firms, these new firms also invest their endowment k into the projects. 
The loan size to each new firm is assumed to be the same as the ongoing projects 
at l each and attract interest at rate i1 . These new firms also have a probability 1r 
of producing y1 > 0 and y1 = 0 otherwise. 
The assumption of lower productivity for firms that are behind in their loan 
repayments is based on widespread observations that less dynamic firms tend to be 
less profitable, and over time they reveal themselves through non-repayment. Also, 
sometimes firms that are in financial trouble may have to engage in actions that 
may compromise their future profitability, such as selling off valuable productive 
assets. Firms that are close to bankruptcy may even have increased attempts by 
staff to siphon resources away for private gain. In this model, these observations 
are represented by having a lower level of productivity () once _a firm is behind in 
repayments. 
Define a variable M to be the number of firms among N that is liquidated, 
0 ~ M ~ N. Should the bank decide to liquidate an incumbent project, the total 
receipt of the liquidation process for the bank is equal to proceeds from the seizure 
and sale of assets. The liquidation process is costly and banks are not able to 
recoup the full amount of the principal.4 Since the size of each bank is very small , 
a bank's sale of its assets into the market does not produce a feedback effect. That 
is, the quantity of assets sold is not substantial enough to change prices in the asset 
market. Therefore, when a project fails, it is assumed that liquidating the project 
3 There are arguments over what the return of a typical 'alternative investment ' is compared 
to an incumbent non-performing one. S0n1e authors argue that new firms have better productiv-
ity, and hence produce better returns than the existing delinquent firms. Corbett and Mitchell 
(2000) suggest that banks that roll over loans are frequently engaging in 'gambling for resurrec-
tion ' , regardless of the chance that it will result in lower expected net worth for itself. Mitchell 
(2001) argues that asset dissipation by firm managers , particularly in bad firms , can lead to lower 
continuation values in rolled over firn1s. 
4 This can be due to various reasons , for example costs in assessing the value of the firm , in line 
with the costly state verification literature, legal costs of the bankruptcy process , or losses from 
selling assets at unfavourable prices. 
16 
will result in only l ( 1 - c), 1 > c > 0 in funds in the same period. The term c 
is constant and is defined as the loss from liquidation. So for a project of size l, 
liquidation results in a loss of cl. 
In the same period, the bank lends out the recouped funds to new firms. An 
important assumption made in this model is that, with regard to the inflow of funds 
from interest income, as much of it as allowed by the capital adequacy regulation 
is lent out. The size of loans to new projects is assumed to be l for simplicity. 
2.3 Bank action 
To look at the action a bank takes given the occurence of bad loans, companson 
must be made between the expected payoffs for period 1 of both the rollover and 
liquidation options of the bank's decision. The bank faces a choice over how many 
projects to close down because liquidation incurs a cost that has to be written 
off, while rolling over a troubled loan means allowing a project to be run at low 
productivity but without write-off. 
Note that in this model, because there is no feedback effect from collateral price 
that can affect the initial decision of the bank, the decision of the bank rests solely 
on the relative attractiveness of the rollover and liquidation actions. Should rollover 
prove to have a higher expected return, then the bank should roll over all its problem 
loans , while if the liquidation and new funds branches offer higher returns, then the 
decision should be to liquidate as many loans as possible. 
The total expected payoff for perfonning projects in period O is equal to its 
probability weighted return. It includes an interest payment i 1 l and principal l. 
There are (P - N) firms involved in this branch so the total expected receipt is: 
(P - N)1r(l + i1 )l . 
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The total expected payoff for period 1 rollover action consists of the probability 
weighted returns from the project that includes both interest payments and the 
principal. If the project succeeds the cash receipt in period 1 is greater than a 
normal performing project. There are N - M projects involved in this branch, 
with rate of success e. The payoff is equal to: 
(N - M)()(l + i0 + i1)l. 
If the draw in period 1 is 'Bad', then the firm produces a project return of 0, 
and so it drops out of the above equation. 
The payoff for liquidation for a bank stems from lending out all available cash. 
This includes the recouped cash from selling collateral and the interim interest 
payments from performing firms. In total M projects are liquidated. Since the 
model assumes there to be no asset price feedback into the banking system, the 
,_ 
disposal of collateral results in a fixed amount of recouped funds equal to Ml(l - c) 
in cash. These funds are then lent out to new firms, with projects that face a 
probability 1r of making a profit. The total expected payoff is: 
There is also the expected return from lending out the inflow of interest income. 
These funds are paid in by the (P - N) firms that pay on time. In period 0, they 
each pay an amount of i0 l in interest. Similiar to above, these funds also go to new 
projects and have chance 1r of success. The expected payoff to lending made from 
these funds is: 
So in period O the total expected payoff (TEP) that faces the bank when it has 
to make a decision of liquidation is a simple addition of the four branches. 
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2.3.1 Profit maximisation without capital regulation 
Since in this model the amount of recouped funds from liquidation is fixed , and the 
entire amount of funds recouped from liquidation is lent out, the expected payoff of 
making such loans can be determined simply by looking at the amount of liquidation 
lvf. As there is no capital regulation, a bank's action depends solely on its cash 
flow position. The simple setup of the model leads to the intuitive result that the 
decision between rollover and liquidation is a binary choice between liquidating all 
bad loans if it is more attractive to do so, or to rollover all of them if otherwise. This 
intuition means that there are only two corner solutions: either optimal liquidation 
M c F = 0 if it is more attactive to rollover the bad loans , or McF = N if it is better 
to liquidate. Representing the discount rate of this economy by R , this choice can 
-
be demonstrated as maximising the total expected payoff (TEP) function: 
n1axTEP 
]VJ 
1 -
R [(P - N)K(l + i1)l + (N - M)e(l + i0 + i1)l 
+Ml(l - c)K(l + i1) + (P - N)iolK(l + i1)]. (2.1) 
Differentiating TEP with respect to M, the condition that governs this choice 
of action is 
e(l + io + i1) = (1 - c)K(l + i1). (2.2) 
This condition simply states that a bank is indifferent between rollover and liquida-
tion if the return to both actions are the same. Should e(l+io+i1) > (1-c)K(l+i1) 
then the bank will rollover all bad loans. The reverse is true if e ( 1 + i 0 + i 1 ) < 
(1 - c)K( l + i1) . 
2.4 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
Officially the CAR is equal to: (Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital) / Risk-weighted assets 
and fluctuates between O to 1. The regulation set by the Bank for International 
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Settlements for the minimum ratio is 8% of total risk-weighted assets. It is a rule 
that concerns the financial position of a bank, as opposed to its cash flow situation. 
As discussed in Barth, Caprio Jr., and Levine (2006), the Basel II guidelines consist 
of four approaches for calculating the capital ratio, some of which are very complex 
due to their reliance on internal ratings-based models. But the spirit of these 
methods is the same as the simple standardised approach, which will be used in 
this chapter. For details of these approaches, see Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2006). 
In this model the regulatory minimum is the lowest level that banks' capital ratio 
can be. They will never conduct operations if it is already below the minimum 
regulated level, nor will they engage in conduct that brings their capital ratio to 
below it. 5 Define variable CR as the required level of capital adequacy. 
To compute the capital ratio of a bank, it is helpful to build the balance sheet 
at different points in time, so that all the actions that may affect the capital ratio 
can be clearly listed. Recall the balance sheet of a bank at the start of period 0, 
before it takes action with its NPLs: 
Balance sheet at start of period 0 
Cash d + z - Pl 
Receivables Pl 
d+ z 
Deposit 
Capital 
d 
z 
d+z 
At the start of the model, a bank's balance sheet contains capital in cash to 
the size of z and deposits d, so the bank has d + z in cash with which to lend out. 
As described above , the bank lends l each to P firms, so the amount of accounts 
receivables is Pl. Now define CR as the capital ratio of the bank at this point. 
Using the simple approach in Basel II, and assuming that all loans are risk weighted 
5 Commonly below this level banks are viewed as unsafe by prudential authorities. Usually 
action will be taken to either take control of the bank ( to nc;Ltionalise it) or other measures will 
be implemented such that the interests of depositors are safeguarded. This may include closing 
down the bank, or bailing it out while changing its management. 
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at 100% for simplicity, 6 this bank's capital ratio is equal to capital over receivables: 
~ z 
CR= Pl" 
A profit-maximising bank in this model will choose to lend out all funds allowed 
by the constraints on cash and capital adequacy. A typical bank's capital ratio is 
hence just high enough to satisfy the minimum CR. 
In period 0, both the numerator and the denominator of the CAR change if 
there are write-offs of NPLs or collections of cash. Recall that interest on deposits 
is normalised to 0. The four events that happen in this period O have already been 
mentioned in section 2.3. Their effects on the capital ratio are detailed below: 
1) The P - N performing projects pay interim interest (P - N)i0 l in total. 
This is income for the banks and enters the balance sheet as retained profits under 
capital. That means it enters the numerator of the capital ratiG. Ceteris paribus, 
the capital ratio rises. 
2) N - lv1 non-performing projects are rolled over. Since the non-recognition 
of problem loans means no provision or expense is made to the accounts, there 
is no change to the capital ratio. Recall that this chapter explicitly models the 
phenomenon of problem loans not being revealed to the public. They remain hidden 
as opposed to the BIS regulation that loans sufficiently long past due date attracts 
a higher risk weight in the capital ratio. If done in accordance with the rules , the 
capital ratio should have in its denominator an extra charge equal to a percentage 
of the NPLs , say r;(N - M)l , 0 < r; < l, as deen1ed appropriate by the authorities. 
The capital ratio will then drop as a result. 
3) lvf projects out of those N non-performing ones are liquidated. The bank 
recoups l(l - c) per project from selling collateral. On the balance sheet , an 
6 Under BIS guidelines , except under some strictly defined benign circumstances in commercial 
property markets , commercial property carries a 100% risk weight. See paragraph 74 in Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). Given the assets in this 111odel are used in production , 
it is appropriate to consider them as commercial property for calculating the capital ratio. 
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amount Ml of loans is written off, but Ml(l - c) is recouped so the net write-off is 
equal to Jvf lc. Capital in the numerator therefore drops by Mlc, receivables in the 
denominator drops by Ml. The effect this has on the capital ratio CR1 depends 
on the size of the loss c. 7 
4) The bank, after having collected cash from events ( 1) and ( 3), then lends the 
funds to new firms, as far as allowed by the constraint on CAR. Such new lending 
includes two components. Their effects of the capital ratio are: 
a) liquidation receipts of up to Ml(l - c) can be lent out. That becomes 
new risky lending and enters the denominator of the capital ratio. The ratio drops. 
b) new loans equal to (P - N)i 0 l can be given from interest income from 
point (1). The capitlal ratio drops. 
A note needs to be made on the fluctuation of the capital ratio with regard 
-
to liquidation and subsequent lending. Recall that in this model it is assumed 
that, subject to constraint, all funds from liquidation, Ml(l - c), will be lent out 
immediately. That means they remain as risky assets. So even if the loss from 
liquidation, c, is low enough to allow the capital ratio to rise after the asset sale, 
the actual ratio at the end of the period will still decline. 8 
The balance sheet at the end of period O can be constructed as follows: 
7 Specifically, given that in period O banks will lend until C Ro is lowered to CR, if c is large 
enough such that the liquidation recoups less than a fraction 1-CR of the loan, then CR1 will 
drop. Otherwise it will improve. 
8In t hat sense, the operation of a bank here is different to a typical 'balance sheet shrinking' 
exercise, where new loans are not given out after liquidation so that the capital ratio improves. 
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Balance sheet at the end of period 0 
Cash d + z - Pl+ (P - N)i0 l Deposits d 
+Ml(l - c) - (P - N)i0 l 
-Ml(l-c) 
Receivables Pl - Ml + (P - N)i0 l Capital z+(P-N)iol 
+Ml(l - c) -Mlc 
d+z +(P - N)i0 l - Mlc d+z+ (P - N)i0 l - A1lc 
Denote the capital ratio at this point in time as C Ro. With the balance sheet 
above, this can be computed as: 
CRo = z + (P - N)i0 l - Mlc . 
Pl+ (P - N)i0 l - Mlc 
Expressed in terms of CR, the CAR constraint in period O becomes 
z +(P-N)i0l-Mlc C 
. ~ R. Pl+ (P - N)i0 l - Mlc - (2.3) 
This equation shows that to improve the capital ratio, the simplest and best 
method is to increase the amount of capital. In this model , interest income ( P -
N)iol collected in period O is immediately lent out as new loans , which increases 
risky assets. Even so, when there is more interest income, the ratio will still 
improve. Note that the amount of interest income is directly dependent on the 
number of delinquent firms N, so a smaller N is associated with a higher capital 
ratio. As well, the term Mlc represents the loss upon writing off bad loans and 
selling off the collateral. If this term is positive, then the capital ratio declines. 
When that is the case, even though writing off bad loans reduces receivables ( which 
is counted in the denominator), capital is impaired even more in the process. See 
also point (3) above. 
Given that the CAR requirement is a positive number between O and 1, denoted 
23 
by CR, and the attractiveness of engaging in as much lending as possible, banks 
will lend out all its funds until C R 0 =CR. 
2.4.1 Profit maximisation with capital regulation 
As mentioned, the capital ratio is a regulation that affects the financial position 
of a bank, with only passing regard to its cash flow position. Therefore, there is 
no reason why capital regulation must become a constraint on bank activity in the 
same way as its cash flow. The minimum capital ratio can become a constraint 
on bank activity with respect to liquidating NPLs only if it is stringent enough. 
When that is the case, the capital ratio expression derived above imposes a limit 
on how much a bank can liquidate its bad loans. 
Since the total expected payoff for a bank is still the same as when there is no 
capital regulation, the TEP function remains the same as equation (2.1). Notice 
-
that even with capital regulation in place, the bank's problem remains a binary 
choice of either rolling over all NPLs, or liquidating as much as allowed by the 
minimu1n capital ratio. Subject to the amount of liquidation being between O and 
N , the maximum level of liquidation can be worked out from the CAR constarint 
equation (2.3). If the 1narginal payoff to liquidation is more attractive, then a bank 
will liquidate as n1uch as allowed, so by setting the binding CAR constraint as an 
equality 
z + (P - N)i0l - Mlc = CR 
Pl + (P - N)i0l - Mlc _ , 
the maximmn level of liquidation M c AR is: 
M _ z - QliPl + (1 - Qli)(P - N)i 0 l 
CAR- cl(l-CR) ' 
subject to O < }/lc AR < N. 
(2.4) 
The above expression implies that higher capital, interest income or lower liq-
uidation cost will raise the maximum level of liquidation allowed under a non-zero 
CAR regulation. 
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2.5 Bank health and behaviour in liquidating bad 
loans 
An important question that demands consideration over a bank's liquidation action 
of bad loans is whether the bank is able to liquidate an appropriate amount given 
its expected payoff. When a negative shock that results in NP Ls happens , banks 
will try to liquidate as much as profit maximisation prescribes. But if the CAR 
constraint binds the bank to a maximum amount of liquidation below what profit 
maximisation asks for, then some evergreening of bad loans due to worsening bank 
health will happen. The bank's expected profits decline as a result. When banks 
are forced by considerations of their own health into evergreening, forbearance rises 
to above the level permitted by unconstrained profit maximisation. 
The above situation of health-induced forbearance will arise if McF, the amount 
of liquidation without capital regulation, is higher than the MQAR· Recall that 
when not constrained by CAR regulation, and liquidation provides better expected 
return, then McF = N. So McF - McAR > 0 is equal to N minus expression (2.4). 
It results in the following condition: 
N > z - Pl[QE(l + i 0 ) - i 0] 
(1-CR)(c-io)l 
As long as the above expression holds, banks are prevented from liquidating 
as much as they wish to, and must forbear some bad loans. To interpret the 
above expression, note that the magnitude of the adverse shock which N represents 
directly influences the capital ratio by affecting how many performing projects pay 
interest. It also determines how much liquidation should be when there is no CAR 
constraint. Under the CAR constraint, the maximum liquidation amount McAR 
may be below McF = N, the unconstrained amount, because liquidating too much 
will drive the capital ratio below CR. If N is too large ( which means McF is too 
large) , then the decline in capital ratio will be too large for banks to write off all 
bad loans. 
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By setting 1'/IcF - McAR = 0, it is possible to look at the value of loan interest 
rate i0 charged in period 1 that can compensate for losses from liquidation such 
that the CAR constraint does not bind, in which case banks are free to maximise 
profit. In other words, when loan rates reach this level, banks are free to liquidate 
all the bad loans on their books, which will guarantee maximum profit. Denote 
this interest rate as Io. This expression is: 
Ncl(l - Q.E) + Q.EPZ - z 
io = (1 - CR)(P - N)l (2.5) 
Unsurprisingly, this level of interest is positively related to the size of the NPL 
shock N, the cost of liquidation c and also the minimum capital requirement CR. 
These three parameters impose costs that bring banks closer to the regulatory 
n1inimu1n, so a higher level of interest income is needed to cover for it. This rate is 
also negatively related to capital z, meaning that well capitalised banks can afford 
to charge lower interest on loans without the CAR constraint binding. If i0 rises 
above this level, then the CAR constraint will not bind. 
The implications discussed above concur with Peek and Rosengren (2005), that 
there is incentive for banks which have capital ratios close to the BIS minimum to 
engage in forbearance lending, out of protection of their own balance sheet. In the 
case of Japan, it has been documented that in the 1980s Japanese banks in general 
had low capital ratios. 9 In the 1990s, the negative productivity shock accompanied 
by slumping asset prices led the Bank of Japan to drastically lower interest rates. 
In the model, this will suggest that loan interest rates in Japan in the 1990s are 
unlikely to be high enough to cover banks ' loan losses such that the CAR would not 
present a problem. It also rules out the possibility of using a 'fat spread' strategy 
to restore bank profitability. 10 The model thus points to forbearance lending as a 
9For example, Singer (2004) quotes the capital ratios of Citicorp and Barclays in 1986 to be 
4.73% and 4.71% respectively. In the same year , that of Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo and Fuji 
were 2.38%, 2.89% and 2.95%. 
10 In the simple environment of this model , with identical banks in a competitive market , it 
is difficult to envisage any bank raising margins to compensate for write-offs. However , it was 
used in the US during the Savings and Loans crisis in the late 1980s. See Koo (2003). The 
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reasonable response. 
Note that following events 1n Japan at that time, this model is constructed 
explicitly with no consequence for the capital ratio if it rolls over bad loans, contrary 
to BIS guidelines.11 It means that there is no need for provisioning for bad loans 
which will lower the capital ratio. Authorities which allow this to happen essentially 
serve to relax the binding CAR constraint. If it had not been allowed in Japan, 
it would have led to even more forbearance lending. This is particularly in line 
with what is described in Peek and Rosengren (2005) as 'balance sheet cosmetics', 
that it is the appearance of health that matters most for these banks. Shimizu 
(2007) describes how these kinds of discretionary changes to interpreting the BIS 
capital ratio have resulted in these published ratios losing its use as a proxy for 
bank safety. Instead, there is evidence that return on assets is a better predictor 
of bank health. Given the NPLs on banks ' books , this is very sensible due to the 
aging of outstanding account receivables. 
This model is also in broad agreement with papers that suggest capital ratio 
requirements to be procyclical. For example, in Kashyap and Stein (2004), BIS 
regulations linlit bank lending in downturns due to the lower ratings given to good 
loans, and also losses from defaults which worsen the capital ratio. In Furfine 
(2001) , it is the flight to holding safe government securities in bad times that leads 
to lower connnercial lending. There is no alternative security or mechanism for 
rating loans in this model, but the same result is arrived at through bank health-
induced forbearance lending. Due to an upper linlit on liquidation imposed by the 
CAR, t he a1nount of funds freed up for new lending is effectively capped compared 
to the unconstrained case. However if t here is less liquidation more funds will 
remain V1rith the non-performing incumbents. 
This chapter also highlights another feature of bank behaviour , that forbear-
'fat spread ' strategy refers to authorities allowing bank loan rates to be much higher than official 
interest rates , giving banks extra profits so that they can afford to write off their bad loans. 
11 Today, officially, loans unpaid for more than 90 days after their due dates must be recog-
nised and their risk weightings increased. See paragraphs 75-78 in Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2006). 
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ance lending can arise as a concern of a bank's own health. Notice that essentially 
M c F - M c AR is equal to the incidence of bank health-induced forbearance. Im-
portantly, this behaviour is forced upon banks and reduces profits. This amount 
of forbearance is different from forbearing loans out of profit maximisation. In this 
simple 1nodel, there is no feedback effect from liquidation and so the optimal action 
without the CAR constraint does not entail rolling over some of the bad loans. 
But in environments with richer dynamics, rollover is a common phenomenon as in 
reality. 12 Therefore there are two types of forbearance that banks may engage in, 
one stemming from profit maximisation and another from safety concerns. It can 
be said that the higher the latter figure is, the further away bank policy is from 
being able to clear NPLs from its books. 
Aside from the obvious use of limiting bank exposure to risk, another important 
question often asked about capital regulation is what impact it will have on banks 
of varying health, since banks in the real world differ in their_ capital positions. 
The effect on the amount of bank health-induced forbearance due to a change in 
prudential regulation requirements ( change in CAR) can be found by computing 
the derivative of equation (2.4). The derivative is: 
8McAR 
8CR 
z - Pl 
cl(l - CR) 2 . (2.6) 
One can see the sign of this expression depends on the magnitude of z - Pl. 
By appealling to the balance sheet at the start of period O in section (2.4) , three 
scenarios can result. 
Case 1: Initially, a bank holds just enough capital to satisfy capital regulation. 
That means the capital ratio of this bank is CR = ;z < l , that is , z = CRPl. 
Substitution yields: 
8]VfcAR 
8CR 
Pl(l - QB_) 
cl(l - CR) 2 
p 
( ) < 0. Cl-CR 
12 See for example Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang (2006) and Kobayashi , Saita, and Sekine (2002) . 
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Being strictly negative, it means that for banks that barely pass the CAR min-
imum, supposedly the most unhealthy among those allowed to operate, tightening 
capital regulation will lead to less liquidation (that is , more forbearance). 
Case 2 : For most healthier banks that hold more capital than the regulated 
minimum, CR< CR= ;z < l. Compared to Case 1, capital is now more plentiful 
relative to risky loans. Substituting into the derivative expression (2.6) above 
results in: 
8McAR Pl(l - CR) 
8CR = - cl(l - CR) 2 < O. 
Here, because CR< CR, the absolute value of the derivative 8~S~R will be 
smaller than in Case 1. But since the derivative is also strictly negative here, it 
means that for this group of banks, the response of maximum liquidation McAR 
to a tightening in capital regulation is also to reduce liquidation ( again, more for-
bearance) , but the impact is more muted. This point is also demonstrated by the 
result 
8McAR 1 
---= >0 8CR8z cl(l - CR) 2 . 
Notice the positive expression for ~~<J:a: means that if banks hold more capital 
initially, then it mitigates somewhat the drop in maximum liquidation allowed due 
to tightening capital regulation. 
Case 3: If a bank holds so much capital ( or makes so few loans) that it covers 
all risky assets, then it does not have to rely on deposits to make new loans. In 
this model, it is reflected by the condition CR< 1 < CR= ;z · This implies z > Pl 
and hence 8~13~R > 0. However , under such a circumstance, capital regulation 
is redundant since even non-repayment of all loans will still not exhaust available 
capital. 
From the evidence above, it can be concluded that when the CAR requirement 
rises , the maximum amount of lending as well as liquidation are reduced ( except 
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for banks that do not have to rely on deposits to give loans). Thus if the CAR 
minimum requirement is raised in period 0, it will result in banks having to 1nake 
fewer new loans, and liquidate less , thus going further away from the optimal amount 
of liquidation. Conversely, if banking authorities lower the CAR requirement in 
response to the negative shock, then it allows more room for banks to liquidate 
delinquent borrowers, the incidence of forbearance decreases, and it will bring the 
bank closer to profit maximisation. New loans to new firms will also increase. 
The same analysis can be carried out to look at how different levels of liquidation 
cost c will impact on maximum liquidation when capital regulation changes occur. 
The second derivative with respect to c is 
8McAR 
8CR8c 
z-Pl 
Again, the sign depends on the relative magnitude of z and Pl. The cor-
responding results for Cases 1 and 2 above (where z < Pl) are both positive: 
8McA R _ P(l-C R) d P(l-CR) · 1 
8QB_8c - c2 (1-QB_)2 an c2(1-QB_)2 respective y. That means when banks face high 
liquidation costs , the change in maximum liquidation allowed per unit change in 
capital regulation is s1naller. This is most likely because with high liquidation 
costs , the amount banks can liquidate is smaller anyway, so forbearance due to 
bank health will not be affected heavily. 
Interestingly, the amount of interest income does not affect the rate of change 
in maximum liquidation when capital regulation changes , as z~:i: = 0. 
To sum up , if varying capital regulations is to be used as a policy lever , then 
banks that hold more capital will face less of an impact to the extent that the 
amount of bad loans they can liquidate will drop by a smaller amount. Also, 
higher liquidation costs in general, which represent losses incurred in the process of 
winding up bad loans , lead to a smaller impact on maximum liquidation, because 
banks will be liquidating less anyway. Importantly, given that ~~°Hi: > 0 for both 
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Cases 1 and 2 above, with CR< CR the expression for Case 2 (};(~~g;_}2 ) is smaller 
in absolute value. That means as banks face higher liquidation costs, those that 
hold more capital ( Case 2) will still face a smaller bite when capital regulation is 
tightened. This latter finding is significant because weak economies tend to have a 
combination of banks with low capital ratios and higher liquidation costs ( or lower 
recoupment receipts). If higher capital regulation is implemented at such a time, 
as is intended with Basel III, then authorities must be alert to the large impact this 
policy will have on the weaker banks. 
Overall, in this model, given that banks are price takers on collateral markets , 
the consideration over liquidation is limited to the polar opposites of liquidating 
all bad loans or for bearing all of them. The crucial point of the decision depends 
on the expected productivities that banks face on the new and rolled-over projects . 
The role the CAR regulation plays in banks ' decisions is to place a limit on the 
maximum amount of liquidation possible should the bank decide ._to liquidate at all. 
This limit , however , can be alleviated by higher loan interest rates or more capital. 
Forbearance lending in this model is the result of sub-optimal profit maximisation. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that in the absence of collateral price considerations, bank 
policy in dealing with NPLs is crucially dependent on two factors that can affect a 
bank's viability as a going concern: the relative future productivities of good versus 
non-performing projects and a possibly binding capital adequacy constraint. This 
outcome differs from opinions expressed by the media and regulators about writing 
off bad loans quickly or slowly. The reason is because these opinions are generally 
made only with preserving the macroeconomy in mind. 
For banks , the forbearance of NPLs can be a natural occurence in the process of 
profit maximisation, but it can also be a result of banks not being able to liquidate 
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their delinquent loans due to the damage it will do to their own health. In that 
sense, unsubstantiated calls for banks to write off their bad loans as quickly as 
possible to provide stimulus to the macroeconomy may not generate desired results. 
It will serve to hurt the returns of banks through reduced bank stability as capital 
is impaired. 
The occurence of large negative shocks means banks are more likely to be pre-
vented from liquidating their NPLs by the capital adequacy requirements. A change 
in the regulatory capital ratios will also serve to change the liquidation behaviour 
of the banks. A lowering of the regulatory minimum is shown to induce banks to 
liquidate more, meaning they have a chance to go closer to maximising profit. An 
increase in the minimum ratio is seen to encourage more forbearance. 
It is shown that for banks that have higher levels of capital adequacy, the amount 
of extra forbearnace that must be borne when capital regulations are tightened is 
smaller. It implies that they are less likely to be hurtfully constrained by capital 
regulation. Also , in environments where costs to liquidation can be high, healthier 
banks with more capital need to forbear less extra bad lo_ans compared to those 
that barely satisfy the capital adequacy ratio. These results hint at less healthy 
banks being much more affected by changes in capital regulation. 
The environment in this model is very simple in that there is no feedback from 
asset prices affecting banks ' profitability, and also that banks can always lend out 
all the funds recouped from liquidation. Events in several countries in the past 
have shown that it need not be the case. Asset prices can be a major consideration 
for a bank, particularly since negative productivity shocks tend to be accompanied 
by asset price decline, and in some cases also a general lack of demand for bank 
loans. These factors have the potential to bear heavily on bank policy. Their 
effects are left for the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Liquidation, Asset Prices and the 
Recycling Channel of Bank 
Lending 
3.1 Introduction 
The behaviour of banks in treating their non-performing loans (NPLs) is fre-
quently debated in the press , particularly close to or during economic downturns 
as NPLs become more of a concern. In such debates banks are often criticised 
for contributing to reducing economic activity in foreclosing on troubled borrowers 
and their subsequent sale of collateral depessing to asset markets. They are some-
times even implicated as culprits for increased unemployment and criminal activity. 
This kind of opinion can be seen from the US government 's plan in late 2007 to 
stop banks from foreclosing on so1ne subprime mortgages. In a press statement , 
then Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson said 1 
Homes in foreclosure can pose costs for whole neighborhoods , as crime 
goes up and property values decline. Avoiding preventable foreclosures , 
then, is in the interest of all homeowners. 
1 U.S . Treasury (2007) , 3rd December. 
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The thrust of this plan is to reduce the magnitude of any firesale of repossessed 
homes by imposing a five-year rate freeze on son1e subprime mortgages and also 
opening up new ways of refinancing some others. 
The argument behind the above plan is that a side effect brought about by 
banks liquidating NPLs is the adverse impact it has on asset markets. By selling 
repossesed collateral, they add to the supply in what sometimes can be an already 
depressed market. This is the view suggested by Minsky (1982), who looks at the 
damaging effects of such sale of assets on the financial system and Shim and von 
Peter (2007) who study how distress selling of assets can produce feedback loops 
that further burden the asset market. 
This is one of the reasons for authorities to slow the process of liquidating such 
loans , for fear falls in asset prices can generate undesirable effects in the economy. 
The discussions of Peek and Rosengren (2005), Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997) 
and Tett (2003) suggest the resultant macroeconomic instability as a reason why 
banks in Japan may have faced pressure from the government to evergreen more in 
the 1990s. In turn, this downward pressure on asset priceq is considered a reason 
why banks should engage in forbearance on their own accord in the first place. 2 
But the story above is somewhat incomplete if it neglects the fact that banks 
do try where possible to make new loans. To gauge the overall effect of treatment 
of NPLs by the banking sector, the increase in the supply of collateral must be 
considered together with banks recycling the funds received into new bank loans. 
Changes in risk appetite notwithstanding, banks which only hold onto the cash must 
pay an opportunity cost, and without other compelling reasons , doing so means 
they are then not maximising profits. Studies which consider collateral prices, 
for example Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang (2006) and Shim and von Peter (2007), 
focus on exploring the nexus between liquidation and falls in asset prices, such as 
2 See for example Kobayashi , Saita, and Sekine (2002) who suggest the reason why banks may 
not terminate bad projects is because liquidation prices can be too low, and the uncertainty over 
whether new projects are good or bad. 
34 
whether liquidation stops at some point or if they reinforce each other. They do not 
consider the effect of banks making new loans from liquidation proceeds. In these 
environments , the economy does not have any new borrowers after liquidation takes 
place. That means recouped funds from repossessed collateral cannot be recycled 
and no new loan can be given. 
This chapter aims to study a bank's decision on clearing NPLs while taking 
explicit notice of the recycling of liquidated funds into new lending, and their impact 
on asset markets. The literature relating to liquidation and collateral markets, 
including Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang (2006), is usually based on the modelling 
arrangements of Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997b), which 
typically specify the ownership structure of collateral by entrepreneurs and the 
borrowing that can be obtained from identical banks based on such assets. The 
amount of borrowing, and hence investment, is limited by the value of the collateral 
pledged, since entrepreneurs have specific skills related to their _projects and face 
a credibility problem when they promise to pay by not running away. In such a 
scenario, a shock to the productivity of the asset which leads their prices to drop will 
cause future bank borrowing to drop in tandem. The advanfage of this setup is that 
it offers a simple mechanism to consider how collateral values affect entrepreneurs 
intertemporally, and alternatively, what sort of impact does bank liquidation have 
on asset prices and future investment. 
Within such a setup , Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang (2006) extend the model by 
allowing fir1ns to fail, in which case banks either liquidate and seize their collateral , 
or forbear the loans to keep the firms alive, and ask how much forbearance banks 
will allow given the relationship between liquidation and collateral prices. Yet by 
concentrating on the current period only, their model is co1npelled to produce falls 
in asset prices whenever there is liquidation and therefore overly strengthens the 
case for evergreening bad loans. A slight moderation of the model employed in their 
paper will introduce a different outcome and show why it is important to consider 
the impact of new bank loans made. By specifically including lending to new firms , 
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there is a channel for new demand for assets which will hence lessen the detrimental 
impact of liquidation on markets. The power of such new loans in stimulating the 
economy is demonstrated in a study of bank failures during the Great Depression 
in Anari , Kolari , and Mason (2005). They study the speed with which deposits 
in failed banks are released by administrators to depositors and its effect on the 
US economy. The average speed of six years was found to prolong the Great 
Depression by not allowing depositors to channel their monies into consumption 
or investment. They suggest banking distress lasted as long as ten years because 
of this slow release of deposits. While they do not study bank loans per se, the 
positive effects of recycling funds into the economy is clear. 
There are a number of studies that focus on the dynamic effects of shocks on 
asset n1arkets and the economy in general. One type of study centres on the 
propagation through changes in investment that often leads to magnification of 
what is originally a small disturbance and produces widespread_ consequences for 
other sectors. A number of studies, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997b) , and Chen (2001), among others, have documented various 
mechanisms through which different shocks can transmit through the economy. A 
different literature, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a), Cunat (2004) , and 
Boissay (2006) documents how terminated borrowers will default on their creditors , 
and in turn put them in difficulty, thus creating chains of default which can also 
propagate through the economy. These papers concentrate on the consequences of 
aggregate shocks , and while they highlight how shocks can start off a series of events , 
their main focus is not on the reactions of the financial intermediaries themselves. 
For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997b) only refer to an aggregate productivity 
shock which triggers the propagation, without identifying the exact mechanism from 
which it is created. While the asset price fluctuates in their model , it acts only as 
an indicator for how much borrowing is given to firms for investment in the next 
period. It is the objective of this study to look at the features of bank decisions on 
treating their NP Ls , and not on how that decision will propagate into other sectors 
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over the future horizon. 
The price of assets is a factor that affects the returns to liquidating bad loans. 
But typically markets in well traded collateral (for example real estate) are deep 
and the pricing power of even large banks in such asset markets is low. This gives 
rise to a phenomenon where even if banks know their collective actions will influence 
asset markets , each is too small to internalise this into their incentive structure. In 
that sense, it is sensible that in dealing with forbearance decisions asset prices is 
not as large a concern as the prospect of making profits from the borrowers, even if 
the individual decisions will have effects for other banks. In fact, the coordination 
of lenders' incentives is one of the things that the US Treasury plan for subprime 
mortgages purports to do, ostensibly by aligning lenders' actions such that they will 
collectively foreclose less. This way, so the argument goes, it may provide some 
support to asset prices. 
As the various lines of literature on propagation mechanisms document , fluc-
tuations in asset prices can have large effects on aggregate economic activity since 
it can impact on the amount of loans given for investment_ and create changes in 
consumption through wealth effects. As noted above, falling collateral prices can 
lead to contraction in bank credit , and when it interacts with debt , it can lead to 
distress selling due to margin calls and trigger contagious downward pressure in 
collateral 1narkets. These are valid reasons for concern from an aggregate point 
of view. But some argue that the superior strength of new firms that enter the 
economy after NPLs are liquidated makes new bank lending a more useful strategy 
to stimulate economies than protecting old delinquent ones. See for example Fukao 
and Kwon (2006) , Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi , 
and Kashyap (2006). Depending on how much can be recycled in this process , the 
new demand created may even overpower the downward influence brought about 
by selling collateral. This possibility is discussed in this chapter as a consequence 
of including recycled bank lending as an explicit decision of banks , made possible 
by relaxing the channel for new production closed off in environments that only 
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consider liquidation. 
Since liquidation of bad loans involves write-offs which can hurt a bank's capital 
position, it is inevitable a study on bank treatment of NPLs will have to consider 
issues of bank health. Capital ratio regulation forms an integral part of what is 
perceived as a bank's strength. 3 It maintains a minimum amount of capital in 
relation to risky assets and seeks to limit the amount of risky new lending or other 
investment by banks. In this sense, capital regulation presents a friction that can 
generate changes in bank behaviour purely by affecting balance sheet variables, and 
not the liquidity resources of banks. 
The effect this regulation has on bank action over NPLs is worth considering 
because liquidation frequently involves writing them off at a loss, which weakens 
bank balance sheet positions. Even if it results in better cash flow, it can potentially 
put banks in breach of such regulation, and force banks to liquidate less than they 
may desire. This rationale for increased forbearance lending is not based on the 
profitability of staying with delinquent firms at all. Also, it is frequently cited that 
capital regulation is pro cyclical due either to the flight of quality in bank assets 
(Furfine (2001)) or wholesale downgrading of credit ratings on borrowers (Kashyap 
and Stein (2004)). This leads to questions over whether capital adequacy regulation 
as an approach is appropriate for monitoring the loan market, as opposed to market 
discipline. See Herring (2004). 
Aside from the analysis of capital regulation, there are two other areas which re-
late to the strategic interaction between regulators and banks that warrant interest. 
They are the issues of regulatory capture and some banks being 'too big to fail ' . 
Regulatory capture points to the phenomenon where some banks , particularly the 
market leaders, 1nay hold regulators to ransom over the setting and enforcement of 
bank regulation. 4 An associated problem relates to the moral hazard that comes 
3 For an exhaustive survey of issues surrounding capital regulation and its relation to banks , 
see Santos (2000). 
4 For more details on how regulators can be influenced by the regulated firms or interest groups , 
see Laffont and Tirole (1991). Hardy (2006) looks specifically at this problem in the banking 
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with the regulators ' fear of allowing big banks to close down, and how banks may 
exploit this weakness to their advantage. Both notions are concerned with the fact 
that some banks or banking groups are bigger or more powerful than others, and in 
the process of profit maximistion, the bigger ones can somehow influence prudential 
regulation. 5 Dealing with these issues will require the incentives of the regulator to 
be considered, as well as to introduce heterogeneous banks in terms of size or scope 
of business. While acknowledging the importance of these issues, to keep matters 
simple this chapter shall only focus on the study of the impact of capital regulation 
on representative banks. 
The general setup of the model is described in the next section. In Section 3.3 
the response of banks in environments without lending, similar to Chen, Chu, Liu, 
and Wang (2006), is looked at, and its outcome is then compared to one when there 
is new lending. Section 3.4 provides discussion on how capital regulation impacts 
on bank balance sheets. The conditions that such regulation Greate and banks ' 
response to them are examined in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Model 
The basic setup of the model follows that of Chapter 2, but with other features 
included. These features are designed to be slight modifications of Chen, Chu, 
Liu, and Wang (2006) , to provide comparison between results. There are three 
periods: -1 , 0, and 1. The analysis concentrates on the current period 0, where 
agents react to events based on their inherited financial position and expectations. 
There are three homogenous but distinct groups of people: a continuum of identical 
banks which finance entrepreneurial production, entrepreneurs (firms) with projects 
but no productive land and landowners who supply the land. Notice there is no 
sector. 
5 For studies on the ' too big to fail ' phenomenon, see Kane (2001) , Stern and Feldman (2004) 
and Ennis and J\1Ialek (2005). 
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crossover between groups, meaning landowners lack the skill to become entrepre-
neurs or bankers and vice versa. The small competitive banks in this world have no 
influence on the asset market individually. They are therefore price takers and do 
not introduce strategic complications to the model in a monopolistic setting. But 
while they cannot influence collateral prices individually, as a whole the collective 
action of the banking sector does weigh on asset markets. 
3.2.1 Banks 
To avoid taking on the risk of lending directly to entrepreneurs, the landowners in 
this economy delegate this responsibility to banks by depositing their funds. But 
since deposit interest does not add anything to the intuition, or alter any result 
in the model, here the deposit rate is suppressed to zero. 6 Banks' only activities 
are to take deposits and make loans. There is no foreseeable potential shock to 
the economy, so banks do not make . any provision or store cash for the event of 
loan losses. One period before the current time, at the beginning of period -1 , 
each bank has an inherited balance sheet with some deposits with which to make 
-
loans. They are each assumed to have optimised their return based on the expected 
profitability of lending and no adverse shock, and have a loan portfolio that contains 
loans to P_1 entrepreneurs. These P_1 'old' firms each has access to a project that 
lasts for two periods , but their own resources are not enough to start the projects. 
To invest , they must take out a fixed loan of value l ( with l strictly positive) to 
purchase land, to be repaid over the life of the projects. Firms must pledge their 
land as collateral. These projects are identical and produce output at the end of 
both periods of operation. As will be explained in more detail in later sections , a 
result of optimisation in this period is that a typical bank lends out all its funds 
until either all cash is exhausted (section 3.3) , or until the capital ratio is at the 
regulated minimum (section 3.4). To simplify the subsequent analysis and to reflect 
6 Since there is a constant amount of deposits in this model , a non-zero deposit interest rate 
will simply add a constant cost to the bank, and merely shift the magnitudes of all results by this 
constant. It does not alter the intuition of any of the results obtained. 
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. - - - • - t) 
Time within period O Event 
Sta1i Bank inherits balance sheet from period -1 
Random shock hits N old firms 
Production of old fmns realised 
End 
Bank collects interest from old fmns 
Bank decides on the number of fmns to be liquidated 
Liquidated firms exit and their collateral auctioned 
New firms enter and boITow funds to buy assets 
Asset p1ice detennined 
Old and new firms staii production 
Capital ratio of bank measured 
Figure 3 .1: Timing of events in period 0 
the main results more clearly, this model will assu1ne that in period -1 the optimal 
action of a bank will be such that all cash is exhausted and the capital ratio touches 
the regulatory minimum. 7 
3.2.2 Firms 
In period 0, 'new' entrepreneurs gain access to a project that lasts for only one 
-period. They each have the same endowment as old firms, k, but like the old firms 
it is too small to start their projects. As a result, to start investing new firms also 
have to take out loans of size l to purchase land for production. The maturity of 
their loans is one period, with the purchased land as collateral. 
To clarify the tinling of events, a figure showing a list of events in period O 1s 
shown in Figure 3 .1. 
Output is realised in period 1 for new firms , and in both periods O and 1 for 
7 As will be demonstrated in sections (3.3) and (3.5), these two conditions do not have to be 
present at the same time for a bank to reach its upper limit in lending volume. Cases where 
only one of these conditions are binding introduce complications into the analysis , which will be 
considered in period 0. To minimise unnecessary complexity, in period -1 , both conditions are 
assumed to be met concurrently. 
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old ones . Interest on the loans is paid immediately after outputs are realised 
each period. The principal is repaid with interest in the last period of a project 's 
operation. As a result of optimisation in period -1, each bank inherits net deposits 
d available for lending and capital z before any loan is given out in period 0. The 
projects of all firms, whether new or old, have positive net present value. The 
discount factor in this economy is given as R > 1, which ensures the value of 
holding money across time will be lower than investing in projects. In this case, 
all entrepreneurs who have the opportunity will start production. From a social 
point of view, as much land should be employed by entrepreneurs as possible since 
otherwise the land remains in low productivity. 
3.2.3 The asset market and lending environment 
The budget constraint facing a new firm entering the asset market is given by 
-Qoko = Qok + l, (3.1) 
where q0 is the asset pnce in period 0, and k0 is the total amount of asset in 
invest1nent. Two further assumptions are that each entrepreneur 's skill is specific 
to his own project, and if an entrepreneur runs away, he is not able to siphon any 
resources already co1nmitted to production. Banks will hence only be left with the 
liquidation value of the collateral. Due to the potential threat that entrepreneurs 
can walk away from their projects, banks will only lend an amount limited to the 
liquidation value of the collateral net of liquidation costs. That loss is defined as 
a fixed proportion c of total receipts.8 Calculated at the period 1 expected asset 
price, the size of a loan is: 9 
(3.2) 
8This can be due to various reasons , for example legal costs of the bankruptcy process , or 
transaction costs in executing the sale. 
9 This structure for the analysis of renegotiation and debt repayment is similar to that of 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997b) and Hart and IVIoore (1994). See original articles for more details. 
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An unexpected shock happens in period O and hits N < P _1 of the old firms 
randomly. That makes t hem unable to pay their first interest payment. Banks 
have t he option to continue financing these proj ects or to liquidate t hem. This 
chapter shall analyse three cases, one in which banks use the funds to finance 
other projects operated by new firms which only start this period, another in which 
banks do not , and a third one where banks lend to new firms under a regime 
of capital regulation. The current capital ratios of banks are measured after all 
actions are taken. For the P _ 1 - N performing projects , the returns for the next 
period are independent of the success of the current period, and have a probability 
0 < 1T < l of n1aking a profit. For the N non-performing projects, their chance 
of success declines to e, e < 1T. This feature follows what is used in Chapter 
2, in allowing for lowering productivity for bad firms. This model shall abstract 
from the effects of bank provisions to highlight the results more : learly and avoid 
unnecessary complication. 
Faced with this decision, banks can do one of three things: 
(1) Rollover t he loans , in which case the proj ects continue. The bank col-
lects nothing in period O and attempts to collect both interests plus principal next 
period. 
(2a) Liquidate t hem and hoard the proceeds, in which case the banks recoup 
some funds by selling the seized collateral. Define a variable M to be the number 
of firms among N that is liquidated in period 0, 0 ~ ]VJ~ N . Cash holdings of the 
banks increase as a result. If capital adequacy regulations are in place, then their 
capital ratios may rise or fall depending on the net gain or loss that result from 
writing off the bad loans. See section 3.4 for details. 
( 2b) Liquidate them and use t he funds for lending to new firms that start their 
projects in period 0. The number of new firms t hat a bank lends to depends on 
their liquidation decision. See below. 
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In period 1, final output is realised for all firms. This is the end period for 
all projects and there is no new entry. Any land used in production is sold to 
the landowners. Banks attempt to collect from rolled-over old firms the overdue 
interim interest , the relevant interest for this period, and the principal. For properly 
functioning old and new firms, banks collect the interest and principal on their loans. 
There is a fixed supply of land K and there is no depreciation. All landowners 
supply their land on demand for new firms entering production. Recall that in this 
model, different groups of people do not posses the skills necessary to switch into 
other groups. Therefore, when the asset market closes these landowners simply 
hold the land not used in production by old or new firms, and are not able to 
become entrepreneurs themselves to start investing. They are not constrained in 
terms of resources and have a decreasing returns to scale production technology 
that allows them to produce with their landholding. The productivity is given 
by H' (K - L k0 ), where K - L k0 represents total land not 11sed in projects. 
H ( •) satisfies the neoclassical assumptions H' ( x) > 0 and H" ( x) < 0 for all x. 
These assumptions ensure that there is non-zero production whatever the state of 
the investment environment. 10 The technology can be represented in Figure 3.2. 
The horizontal axis measures how much land is held by landowners. So point 
A represents more land used in investment than point B, meaning the land price 
corresponding to point A measured by H' (A) is higher than at point B. 
In period 0, the supply of land comes from both landowners and also banks ' 
liquidated collateral. Due to the unconstrained nature of landowners ' production, 
their benefit of holding land for the current period is equal to the discounted mar-
ginal benefit of production H' ( •) this period ( which is realised in period 1) plus the 
resale value of the land in the next. So the asset price can be expressed as follows: 
10 This technology raises the production value of landowners if more land is employed in invest-
n1ent by entrepreneurs. This can be rationalised by supposing that landowners produce a good 
different to investment output. For example, firms produce manufactured goods while landowners 
produce agricultural products. If more land is used in investn1ent , then the supply of agricultural 
products decline and their value rises. 
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H(K-Eko) 
A B K-Eko 
Figure 3.2: Asset price and technology of landowners 
(3.3) 
where I: k0 = ( P _ 1 - M) k_ 1 + P0 k0 . From the expression for I: k0 it is clear that 
the effect of liquidation per se on the asset market is to depress the asset price. 
However , this is tempered by the new lending that liquidation makes possible , 
since it generates new demand for assets from new firms. To facilitate easier 
understanding of the model, it is useful to impose a functional form for this equation 
that satisfies the assumptions. Assume the production of the landowners is 
so the asset price equation becomes 
qo = !_H'(•) + Eq1 = A + Eq1_ ( ) 
R R R(K - P_1 k_ 1 + Mk_ 1 - P0 k0 ) R 
3
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3.3 Bank response to the NPLs problem 
3.3.1 Banks without new lending 
To illustrate the economy without recycled lending, this section depicts an envi-
ronment based on that of Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang (2006) , by shutting off the 
recycling channel that allows banks to make new loans. There is no entry of new 
entrepreneurs after liquidation takes place. The main point of this subsection is to 
highlight how the economy must produce falls in asset prices if the recycling channel 
of lending is not considered. In their model, no new entrepreneur will enter the 
world at period 0. In period 0, the bank chooses a course of action regarding the 
NPLs based on profit maximisation, by choosing the number of firms to liquidate 
M. Since no new entrepreneur enters the economy, once the bank auctions off the 
liquidated collateral, the cash is simply hoarded and lies idle. Except for a cost 
associated with the process of liquidation, there is no other explicit cost to banks , 
so banks ' expected profit is equal to expected revenue. 11 Hence unlike equation 
(3.3), here Eq1 = 0 and Po = 0, meaning qo = 1H'(K - P --:-1k_1 + Mk_1). It is 
immediately apparent that given H' ( x) > 0 and H 11 ( x) < 0, an increase in M will 
lead to a decline in q0 . Each new case of liquidation causes the asset price, and 
hence bank receipts from that case, to drop. As there is no new lending to any new 
firm, there is no such thing as a budget constraint for them, or profit that a bank 
can expect to make from making new loans. In this scenario, the typical bank's 
problem is simply to maximise its period 1 expected profit with respect to M: 
subject to 
11 The deposit interest is suppressed to zero to simplify the algebra. 
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0 ~ M ~ N. 
The above equation says that total expected profit for the bank comes from 
three sources: performing companies which pay their interest and principal next 
period; rolled over firms which pay their overdue and current interest and principal 
next period; and receipts in the current period from liquidation of seized collateral. 
The constraint simply says that the nu1nber of firms liquidated is limited to the 
number of delinquent firms in the maximum. 
Setting up the Lagrangian£ , the first order condition is: 
(3.5) 
This condition says that the optimal amount of liquidation should equalise the 
marginal benefit of rollover on the left hand side and liquidation on the right. 
Making use of the condition for asset price in this environment one can see the 
negative relationship between marginal benefit and number of cases of liquidation. 
Imposing the assumed functional form , the marginal benefit of liquidation without 
new lending M Enz is equal to: 
The case of an interior solution for NI is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
From the first order condition (3.5) , an expression for q0 can be found: 
(3.6) 
(3 .7) 
This asset price expression can be used with the asset market equation q0 = 
1 H' ( K - P -1 k_ 1 + Mk_ 1) to find M. Using the assumed functional form, an 
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Figure 3.3: Marginal benefit of rollover and liquidation 
explicit expression for M can be found by equating it with the equilibrium asset 
pnce: 
Recall that the asset price q0 will decline as liquidation rises, and that makes 
recoupment through liquidation less and less fruitful , to a point where it is more 
valuable to forbear some cases of bad loans. 
The explicit solution of M is equal to: 
Note that the rollover payoff, 6(1 + i 0 + i 1), is negatively related to liquidation, 
indicating the decision of banks to liquidate is directly related to the perceived 
benefit of evergreening. 
To find the asset price q0, the solution to M should be put into the asset price 
equation, in this case Qo = 1H'(K - P_1k_ 1 + ~A1k_ 1 ) . If the values of exogenous 
parameters is such that M is an interior solution, 0 < M < N, then this substitution 
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will simply yield back the first order condition expression ( 3. 5), and q0 is equal to 
equation (3. 7) found above. 
The asset price is a result of all banks each maximising their respective profit. 
As explained in the previous section, this price will not decline to zero. The 
equilibrium price for land will remain equal to the productivity of the land itself 
if banks do not give any loan at all , since there will then be no investment in this 
world to start with and no liquidation afterwards. 
If the values of the exogenous parameters are such that the condition O ~ M ~ N 
is violated, then the optimal M must be a boundary solution, that is, M = 0 or 
M = N. In such cases, the boundary solutions M = 0 and M = N must be used, 
resulting in: 
when M = 0, and 
when M = N. 
3.3.2 Banks with new lending in period 0 
If banks are allowed the option of investing the recouped cash from liquidation, 
then due to the positive expected profits they may earn, they will lend out the 
funds where possible. This has two effects from the banks ' point of view: firstly 
expected profits of the bank do not comprise liquidation receipts directly any more, 
rather the expected return from new loans given out of those receipts is included ; 
and secondly, the entry of new firms will bring new demand to the asset market , 
which mitigates the drop in asset prices caused by selling liquidated collateral. The 
overall in1pact on the asset 1narket will be the result of a number of opposing effects. 
Recall that in the illustration of the environment in Chen, Chu, Liu, and Wang 
(2006) in the previous subsection, no new entrepreneur enters the economy and 
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banks do not 1nake any new lending, so liquidation simply recoups some immediate 
cash. But here, banks have the option to lend to new firms , so the positive expected 
profits from this action may induce banks to liquidate more than in the case without 
new lending. Recall also that land has a minimal production value, below the 
expected value of investment, to new firms as well as banks, which means that 
the land can be meaningfully pledged in the writing of debt contracts for the new 
entrepreneurs in period 0. By allowing for the occurrence of recycled lending, the 
entry of new firms brings new demand for assets, so the asset price maybe supported 
somewhat ( or even overwhelmed) by this new demand. Hence the decline in asset 
prices in event of bank foreclosure may not be as severe as commonly referred to if 
bank activity in granting new loans is considered. 
To keep the model simple, there is no crossover between landowners, entrepre-
neurs and banks as mentioned in Section (3.2). That means even if there are cases 
where, for example, the return to investment is more attractive thalf that of agricul-
tural production, landowners and bankers cannot switch and become entrepreneurs 
and disrupt the supply of land. The assumption is made that there is a steady 
inexhaustible supply of new entrepreneurs into the economy. -
To illustrate the maximisation, certain details regarding the lending behaviour 
of banks must first be made clear. It is helpful to start with viewing the balance 
sheet of a typical bank before and after events take place in period 0. 
Table 3.1: Balance sheet at start of period zero 
Cash d + z - P_ 1l 
Receivables P_ 1l 
Deposit 
Capital 
d 
z 
At the start of period O each bank has net deposits d available for lending, and 
capital in cash to the size of z . That means each bank has d + z in cash with 
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which to lend out. The bank has lent l dollars each to P_1 firms, so the amount 
of accounts receivable is P_ 1l. As a result of optimisation in period -1 , each bank 
lends out all its cash in parcels of l dollars each to old firms. Assuming there is no 
interbank borrowing, in period -1 a binding cash constraint prescribes that: 
In the course of period 0, the following three things happen that will impact on 
the balance sheet of a bank: 
1) The P_1 - N performing projects pay interim interest (P_ 1 - N)iol in total 
( each firm pays interest at rate i0 on its loan of value l). This is cash income for 
the bank. Notice that this is independent of the amount of liquidation a bank 
undertakes. It enters the balance sheet with the following entry d~noting increases 
in the relevant accounts: 12 
DR Cash (P-1 - N)iol 
CR Capital (P-1 - N)iol 
2) M projects out of those N non-performing ones are liquidated. The bank 
recoups qok-1 (1 - c) per project from selling collateral, where q0 is the collateral 
price in period 0. At the same time, those M loans are written off. Assuming the 
bank makes a loss upon liquidation, the net write-off is the difference between the 
12 Strictly speaking, the credit side should be entered into the Interest Income account , but for 
the purposes of this model, this income is considered as profit, and since there is no dividend or 
other costs, the whole sun1 becomes retained profit which counts as capital. To simplify matters , 
this entry cuts the many intervening accounting entries and only shows the final effects on the 
accounts. 
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two, M l - q0 1111 k_ 1 ( 1 - c) . On the balance sheet, the final effects are represented 
by this simplified entry: 13 
DR Capital 
DR Cash 
CR Receivables 
lvfl - q0Mk_1 (1 - c) 
q0Mk_1 (1 - c) 
Ml 
3) The bank, after having collected cash from events (1) and (2) , then proceeds 
to lend out the funds to new entrepreneurs. This amount is equal to Pol subject 
to a limit on available cash. These funds include two components: 
a) liquidation receipts of q0 Mk_ 1 ( 1 - c) . 
b) interest income (P_1 - N)i0 l from point (1). 
The N - M NPLs are supposed to attract an extra capital charge in calculating 
the capital ratio. For purposes of illustration such charges are not included in this 
model. In any case their inclusion does not affect any of t_he qualitative results. 
For a discussion on bank provisioning, see section 3.4.1. Non-provisioning for bad 
loans has been the practice of many banks in many countries in which regulatory 
regimes are not properly enforced. As documented in Peek and Rosengren (2005), 
this was also the case for Japanese banks in the 1990s.14 In this model, since 
the non-recognition of problem loans means no provision or expense is made to the 
accounts, there is no change to the capital ratio. The number of new firms receiving 
13 Again , t he debit to Capital should go through an expense account representing t he net write-
off, and t he debit to t he Cash account should be made to an asset account to record the possession 
of collateral. Here it is assumed that t he collateral is sold at market price, and the resulting net 
write-off carries t hrough as a retained loss to the Capital account. If t he sale results in a book 
profit , t hen it should increase capital, thus necessitating a credit entry to the Capital account 
instead . 
14 The 'evergreening ' practice in J apan frequently involves giving an extra loan equal to the size 
of the current interest payment , which the borrower uses to pay t he bank. In t his way, the loans 
are not classified as non-performing. This is partly condoned by t he aut horities because proper 
recognition of bad loans would greatly reduce the capital rat ios of banks and possibly cause panic 
in the general public. 
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a loan is found in the maximisation. The balance sheet at the end of period O is 
constructed in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Balance sheet at end of period zero 
Cash 
d + z - P_1l + (P-1 - N)iol 
+q0Mk_1 (1 - c) - Pol 
Receivables 
P_1l - Ml+ Pol 
Deposits 
d 
Capital 
z + (P-1 - N)iol - Ml 
+q0Mk_1(l - c) 
To find out the maximum amount of new loans that is feasible for period 0, the 
cash constraint must be consulted. It should be obvious from the size of P_ 1l and 
point (3) above that the maximum amount of available funds is equal to liquidation 
receipt plus interest income. Given the positive expected return of new projects , 
banks will lend out all their funds , so this constraint will be binding: 
(3.8) 
Armed with the list of events , the balance sheet , and the cash constraint it is 
now possible to detail the maximisation problem of a bank. Recalling d+ z = P_1l , 
the Lagrangian takes the following form: 
subject to 
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M~N, 
The last constraint describes the asset price to be at least equal to or larger 
than the minimum production value of the land if it is not used in investment. 
However , with the recycling channel in operation, and the fact that interest income 
in event (1) being independent of liquidation, there must always be some lending 
to new firms that purchase land. This constraint will therefore never bind in this 
environment. 
-
By setting the last two constraints to be non-binding (A2 = A3 = 0) , the relevant 
first order conditions of the Lagrangian are: 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
In this environment , a bank is considering the marginal returns to rolling over 
the firms which produce an expected return of 1 e ( 1 + i 0 + i 1 ) l , against the expected 
return of liquidating and then lending out the funds. The first order condition 
(3.9) says that liquidation should proceed until the marginal benefit of rollover , 
the negative term, is equal to the marginal benefit of liquidation. This marginal 
benefit comes directly from the recouped funds when selling collateral. The second 
equation (3.10) gives a relationship between the marginal benefit of giving each 
new loan against its cost. From this equation Ai can be worked out as A1 = 
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1 n ( 1 + i 1), meaning the shadow benefit of liquidation is simply the discounted 
expected return from new lending. A non-zero A1 confirms the cash constraint to 
be binding. Substituting this into equation (3.9), an expression for the asset price 
q0 can be worked out: 
(3.11) 
Given the shadow price of new loans for banks , this level of q0 will result at the 
optimum, equalising marginal benefit and marginal cost of liquidation for banks. 
For details of how this is arrived at, see Appendix A. 
A relationship between M and P0 can be worked out if q0 is put into the cash 
constraint equation (3.8), with d + z = P_ 1l. The resulting expression for M and 
P0 is: 
M = [Po - (P-1 - N)io]n(l + i1 ). 
8(1 + io + i1) (3.12) 
This expression states that with all exogenous parameters held constant, the 
more liquidation there is , the more new firms will get loans. This is sensible 
since one of only two endogenous sources of funds for new lending comes from 
liquidating bad loans ( the other is interest income from good firms). Contrast this 
with the previous section where there is no new lending. Here more liquidation 
actually contributes to 1nore new loans , which can potentially increase expected 
profit for banks. The first bracketed term in the numerator represents the funding 
gap between new loans and interest income, and it must be made up by liquidation 
receipts. Also reflected in this expression is the idea that if the returns to rollover 
8(1 + io + i1) is higher , the less liquidation there should be, and vice versa for the 
liquidation return 1r ( 1 + i 1). 
Details of solving for other variables is found in Appendix A. 
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The trade-off between marginal benefit and cost for the bank is illustrated in 
Figure 3.4, similar to Figure 3.3. From the Lagrangian, one can find the total 
( and hence marginal) cost to liquidation is the same as the case without lending in 
section 3.3.1. The total benefit to liquidation is 
Making use of the binding cash constraint (3.8) results in P0 l = (P_1 - N)iol + 
q0Mk_1 (l - c). So the marginal benefit with respect to lvf is equal to qok- 1 (1 -
c)n(l +i1 ). Drawing on the fact that the price floor constraint for q0 is not binding, 
it means that Eq1 > 0. So the form of the asset price equation here is identical to 
equation (3.4). That yields the marginal benefit M Bcash to be: 
Comparing this marginal benefit expression with the one without lending in 
equation (3.6) , it is easy to see MBcash > MBnl· Due to the recycling channel, the 
demand for land by new firms pushes up the asset price by _giving it an expected 
non zero value in period 1, demonstrated by E11 > 0. Also , the extra land used in 
investment by new firms means P0 k0 > 0, making the productivity of the landowners 
rise (see footnote 10). As well , the expected return of lending to new firms , n(l+i1 ) , 
is larger than 1 as assumed to ensure banks will lend to new firms. These changes 
shift the M Bcash line upwards in Figure 3.4, resulting in more liquidation. 
Recall that in this model, each bank is too small to be able to affect the asset 
price, but collectively, their actions form a sectoral influence on the land market 
and hence on its equilibrium price. To compare the outcome of this environment 
meaningfully with the one without lending in section 3.3.1 , it is useful to note 
that there is a chance the asset price actually rises when new lending is given out , 
whereas that is not possible without the recycling channel operating to generate 
new loans. The proposition below summarises the result. 
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Figure 3.4: Marginal benefit of liquidation with cash constraint 
Proposition 1 The asset price will rise if the proportional cost of liquidation c is 
smaller than the down payment as a fraction of total investment ;
0 
• Otherwise, the 
asset price will drop. 
Proof. See appendix B. • 
The critical point occurring at k is a result of the inflow of new firms with ko 
their endowment. To understand this result it is useful to think of the size of 
funds active in the asset market due to the liquidation process. In the course of 
liquidating loans , banks recoup a body of funds from which a proportion c is lost. 
This an1ount is then lent away to new firms in constant-sized loans , who seek to 
-
start their investment by using their endowment k to make downpayments in their 
loans. That means if new endowment as a proportion of total land purchased, ;
0 
, 
is higher than the proportion lost in liquidation, it will have more than replaced this 
loss and result in more funds in the market demanding land than before. The asset 
price therefore rises as a result. Intuitively speaking, the more costly liquidation is , 
the less funds will be recouped and lent out to new firms. The smaller this demand 
is, the less support there is to the asset price. Alternatively, if the cost is small , 
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then more money can be lent and it becomes possible that the support from new 
demand overwhelms the downward pressure of the liquidation and makes the asset 
price rise. This effect does not exist in environments with no new firm entering the 
economy and where banks do not lend out their liquidation receipts. It means that 
models that look at bank liquidation alone can only conclude in linking foreclosure 
with depressing asset prices. 
It should be noted that collateral in this 1nodel is assumed, on liquidation, to 
be readily convertible to a new project without cost. If this assumption is relaxed , 
it means the demand for assets may not be as strong as the case illustrated in this 
section, since new entrepreneurs will have to cover an extra cost to convert their 
assets to suit their projects. When that is the case, the demand for loans may not 
be as strong as before , hence weakening the recycling channel. In the real world, 
the collateral pledged to banks can take many forms , such as land, physical chattels , 
productive machinery, and even a borrower 's financial assets or str_eams of income. 
Among these types, some are easily and cheaply converted into cash by the bank 
and used for new lending; others , like land, are fairly flexible in converting usage 
with a cost. However , certain types of assets and productive machinery may only 
be suitable for limited uses and have shallow resale markets , thus making it difficult 
for banks to quickly convert into cash for recycling. Typically, a bank with firms 
in various industries as customers will have a mix of different categories of assets 
as collateral. 15 
In the case of this model, with land being the collateral analysed, there are 
likely some obstacles to the recycling of collateral though they are by no means 
15The fact t hat banks can take hold of a specific asset up on default (in cont racts known as 'fixed 
charges ' in legal parlance) implies a lin1itation on firms t hat they may not sell them in the course 
of business. That in turn limits the kinds of assets t hat firms can usefully pledge as collateral. 
As such , it is also fairly comrnon that banks hold collateral t hat is not a designated item, but 
rather a stipulated amount of a class of assets ('floating charges') . Such charges allow collateral 
pledged to be traded freely by entrepreneurs and so raises both the kinds of assets and t he amount 
that can be pledged. The benefit of floating charges for banks are twofold: the amount loaned 
can be raised and more easily convertible collateral is pledged. The result is a mix of types of 
collateral, son1e of which can be converted more quickly t han others. For more information, see 
Finch (2002) . 
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prohibitive and land continues to be commonly accepted by banks for mortgages. 
Entrepreneurs will incur extra cost if there are government regulations on land 
use. Environmental and zoning assessments are made which takes time and some-
times result in a fee or mitigating action (such as reforestation or infrastructure 
works) that must be paid or completed before "the new project is approved. A 
concrete example of such regulation occurs in Hong Kong, where the government 
frequently charges entrepreneurs a 'land premium' when the type of activity on 
the land changes. 16 Also, geographical limitation may mean that in each region 
there is a smaller number of new entrepreneurs entering the economy, so demand 
for land may be reduced. To locate firms in regions far away from their markets 
means entrepreneurs face higher transportation costs, which should also reduce the 
attractiveness of this option. For studies on how geographical factors can affect 
investment and the demand for productive land, see Fujita, Krugn1an, and Venables 
( 2000) and references therein. 
Be that as it may, as with other studies that consider collateral prices and bank 
lending, in this model these costs are suppressed so that complications with the 
different cost structures are avoided. 
3.4 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
The capital ratio is calculated for each typical bank as a requirement by authorities. 
In its n1ost simple form, the capital ratio is equal to total eligible capital divided by 
total risk-weighted assets. The commonly accepted Basel standard for this ratio 
is a minimum of 8%. The idea of imposing capital regulation is to use a financial 
constraint to limit the risk-taking behaviour of banks, and in so doing improve their 
16Information given on the website of the Lands Departn1ent of Hong Kong states that 
11 [n1]odifications [of land use] ... shall .. . be granted at premium reflecting the difference be-
tween the 'before' and 'after ' land value" (Lands Department of Hong Kong (2005)). The ' land 
value ' is assessed on the basis of the kind of activity on it, e.g. industrial, residential or com1nercial 
and the specific industry of the new venture. For 1nore details , see the Lands Department website 
http://www.landsd.gov.hk. 
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risk profile as measured by on-balance sheet items. 17 
This model will use the standardised approach in Basel II to calculate this ratio. 
See Basel Co1nmittee on Banking Supervision (2006) for details. In this model 
the regulatory minimum is the lower bound that banks' capital ratio must reach, 
defined as CR. Operation at a ratio under this level is ruled out. In measuring 
risk-weighted assets, a 100% risk weight will be used for all risky assets. This will 
not alter any of the conclusions obtained and simplifies matters a great deal. 
3.4.1 The impact of bank provisioning 
Provisioning is an important way for banks to buffer against loan losses and can 
have a sizable influence on bank capital ratios. It involves expensing some current 
period profits to set up a buffer against which future bad loans can be written 
off. Essentially this reduces current year accounting profits in return for a smaller 
drop in future profits in case bad loans occur. In calculating the capital ratio it is 
stated in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) that, subject to certain 
lin1its, general provisions not set aside for a particular known adverse event can be 
included under Tier 2 capital, and risky assets can enter the ratio net of any specific 
provisions set against them. So while current profits and Tier 1 capital drop as a 
result of provisioning, it does not negate the benefit it brings to the overall capital 
ratio. 
While there are BIS ( and in some countries, specific accounting) guidelines over 
what level of provision is appropriate for what sort of potential losses, the final 
decision is down to the management of the bank, and banks do frequently provision 
more than prescribed by guidelines. But these decisions are mainly dictated by 
market conditions and by business strategy, and are hence outside the scope of this 
171n the last few years , the events in the banking sector concerning write-downs on subprime 
related securities have drawn attention to banks' tendency to not recognise risky assets on the 
balance sheet. How such off-balance sheet items can be regulated properly by capital adequacy 
rules remains to be seen. 
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study. Indeed, sometimes the amount of provisioning is recognised as a proxy for 
the management's assessment of future prospects, and this may affect the amount 
made in the first place. 
As a result, while acknowledging that provis1on1ng adequately is one way of 
protecting a bank's capital ratio from suffering large drops in event of borrower 
default, this model will not consider the effects of bank provisions. This is so 
because the decision over how much provision to make is not modelled, and only 
including the bare minimum required by guidelines will complicate the algebra but 
add very little intuition. For example, the occurrence of an NPL will result in 
a capital charge equal to a percentage of the amount . This adds a constant to 
the denominator of the capital ratio, worsening the capital position of a bank and 
hence reduces its scope to make new lending. Suffice to say the inclusion of such 
provisioning will act to tighten the capital ratio as a constraint on a bank's lending 
behaviour. 
3.4.2 The CAR constraint 
By not including bank provisions, it means that bank equity forms all eligible capi-
tal , and a bank's decision on the amount of liquidation and its associated write-offs 
should be the only things affecting a bank's balance sheet. 18 To look at the capital 
position of a typical bank, recall the two balance sheets in Tables (3 .1 ) and (3.2) 
from section 3.3.2. There is d + z in cash ( of which z is capital) loaned out in 
period -1 at l per firm to P_1 firms. As mentioned in section 3.2 , to simplify mat-
ters for comparison, in period -1 , banks have optimised and as a result lent out the 
maximum amount of funds allowed by regulations. That means CR_1 =CR: 
18 Recall that banks in this n1odel do not make any interbank loans or hold or issue securities 
that can affect their capital ratios. 
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In period 0, both the numerator and the denominator of the CAR change if 
there are write-offs of NPLs or collections of cash. Events that happen in period 
0 and discussed in section 3.3.2 have the following effects on the CAR. For ease of 
reference, they are listed below: 
1) Interest income amounting to (P_1 -N)i0 l enters the balance sheet as retained 
profits under capital. It raises the capital ratio. 
2) Liquidation of each project gives a bank q0 k_ 1 (1 - c), but at the same time 
a loan of l is written off. Aggregated over M projects , the net change in the 
numerator can be either up or down, while risky assets (denominator) are cut. The 
impact on the capital ratio C Ro depends on whether the recoupment from sale is 
sufficiently large to cover a proportion (1 - CR_1) of the write-off. If it does , then 
the capital ratio rises and vice versa. 
3) New lending is made subject to the capital ratio constraint. This amount is 
equal to P0l , which may be all or part of the sum of liquidation receipts q0 M k_1 (1-c) 
and interest inco1ne (P_1 - N)i0 l. The size of this amount depends on the amount 
of liquidation M and the CAR regulatory minimum. 
As 1nentioned in section 3.3.2, non-performing projects which are rolled over 
remain off-balance sheet, because there is no occurrence of any transaction, as 
opposed to the regular treatment required by accounting standards which writes off 
a certain amount against bad debt provisions. 
The period O capital ratio can be computed from the balance sheet for period 
0 in Table (3 .2). This 1nust obviously also be equal to or above the regulatory 
ffilnln1UlTI: 
CR _ z + (P_1 - N)i0l + q0 Mk_1(I - c) - Ml C o - ~ R. P_1l - Ml+ P0 l -
Since the CAR requirement is positive, and given the attractiveness of engaging 
in as much lending as possible (because the expected return on projects is positive, 
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hence firms should on average have no problem making interest payments), the 
banks should lend out all its funds until C Ro = CR, if they are not otherwise limited 
by the cash constaint. Rearranging the above results in the CAR constraint: 
(3.14) 
The above constraint shows that while the CAR somewhat protects the health 
of banks, it does so by only limiting the recycling of bank loans , denoted by P0 l. 
That means the recycling channel, which can provide crucial support to the asset 
market, may be compromised. 
3.5 Bank action under capital regulation 
3.5.1 Liquidation under the CAR constraint 
If CAR regulations are imposed, then bank lending is now subject to both the cash 
and CAR constraints (3.8) and (3.14). To see what the feasible set of bank ac-
tions will be when they are bound by these two constraints , it is helpful to detail 
the 1naximisation problem under only the CAR constraint , and then compare with 
alternative cases , for example the one without the CAR in section 3.3.2. While 
the cash constraint is important because it is the absolute limit of new bank lend-
ing, here the question of interest is whether CAR regulation will become a tighter 
constraint on bank lending in some circumstances. 
Recalling that in period -1 banks ' optimisation results in both CR= z / P_ 1l and 
d + z = P_1l, the maximisation problen1 with CAR regulation is 
1 
max R [(P-1 - N)( l + i1)1rl + (N - l\!l)B( l + i0 + i1)Z + P0 l1r(l + i1)] Jvl ,Po 
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subject to the CAR constraint (3.14): 
cash constraint (3.8): 
the price floor constraint: 
and 
M~N. 
The case with only the CAR constraint binding requires taking ,\1 > 0 as its 
multiplier and ,\2 = ,\3 = ,\4 = 0 for the other non-binding constraints , the first 
order conditions are: 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
There is an extra term ,\1 (CR- l)l in the first order condition (3.15) compared 
to equation (3.9) in the cash constraint case. That term represents two opposing 
effects specific to the CAR constraint with its balance sheet-based nature. When 
liquidating a loan, it must be written off on the balance sheet ( see accounting entry 
(2) in section 3.3.2) , and this marginal cost is represented by -,\1l. But after 
writing off this bad loan, capital set aside for it is not required any more. This 
is a marginal benefit to liquidation, to the amount of ,\1CRl. These two effects 
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have no particular bearing on the cash position of a bank, as witnessed by their 
non-appearance in the cash constraint (3.8), but here they affect bank behaviour 
nonetheless. The sign of this term is negative, which means under a binding CAR 
constraint, liquidation is more costly than in the cash constraint case, giving rise 
to the possibility that the CAR can potentially be stricter on banks regarding 
liquidating bad loans. 
Substituting >.1 from the second condition (3.16) into the first (3.15) yields the 
asset price in equilibrium: 19 
[QEB(l + i0 + i1) + (1 - Q__E)n(l + i1)]Z 
qo = n(l + i1)k_1 (1 - c) (3.17) 
Putting this expression back into the CAR constraint (3.14), the relationship 
between M and P0 can be found: 
M = n(l + i1)[z + (P-1 - N)i0l - Q__El(P_ 1 + P-a)]. 
-CRB(l + io + i1)Z (3.18) 
This is the CAR analogue of expression (3.12). Despite the negative sign in the 
denominator , Appendix D shows this expression for M to be positive. As with the 
cash constraint-only case in section 3.3.2 , explicit expressions for the endogenous 
variables can be found by repeated substitution using equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) 
from the firms sector, asset market, and an imposed functional form for H' ( •) , as 
detailed in Appendix A. 20 The relationship here between M and P0 is a positive 
one, indicating, just like the cash constraint case, that more liquidation makes 
more funds available for new lending. As expected, the amount of liquidation ( and 
hence the amount of new lending) is conditioned by the regulatory minimum, as 
the original point of capital regulation is to limit the amount of risky assets in a 
bank's portfolio. 
19 Again , see Appendix A for details of solving for the variables. 
20 Boundary solutions can be obtained if the solution for M is below O or above N. If M = 
0 then the CAR constraint is not binding, it regresses into the cash constraint case, so Po = 
( P -1 - N) io. If the bank optimised M = N, then using the CAR constraint the optimal P0 = 
1 [ 7r(l+i i ) NCR (P N). ] CR B(l+io+ii) _ + -1 - io . The resulting asset price will therefore also be different. 
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3.5.2 Binding conditions for the CAR constraint 
To find out at what range of values which constraint will bind tighter , the expres-
sions for M in the cash-constrained and CAR-constrained cases (3.12) and (3.18) 
are used to construct a graph with the two control variables on the axes. Again 
recalling that from period -1 that CR= z / P _ 1 l and d + z = P -1 l , the two equations 
are rearranged into the following for user-friendliness: 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
Consider equation (3.20) , the term in square brackets ckz [qok-1 (1-c)-(1-C R)l] 
represents the marginal change of P0 if M is increased by one unit (it is the slope 
of this line). It says that this change is proxied by the difference between the 
liquidation receipt [q0 k_ 1 (1 - c)] minus the write-off l, augmented by the capital 
freed up by this write-off, equal to C Rl. Recall the last item is simply the result of 
a reduction in capital requirement due to the write-off which decreases the amount 
of risky assets on the balance sheet. Given that in this model it is assumed that 
the expected return of lending to entrepreneurs is positive, and it is impossible 
for bankers to switch into other forms of production, the sole task for banks is 
to decide how much to liquidate so that new loans can be given out to capture 
the future expected profit. As such, it is not sensible to have tl:1is term negative. 
A negative slope would imply rising liquidation M but reduced new lending P0 , 
meaning funds are hoarded at the expense of positive expected profit from new 
loans. In this environment , no profit-maximising bank will liquidate if it results in 
less new lending. Hence this equation must have a positive slope. 
The case where the cash and CAR constraints cross each other is presented 
in Figure 3.5. To look for the feasible set of bank action under each constraint , 
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Cash constraint 
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Figure 3.5: The cash and CAR constraints cross 
consider point A if the bank is only under a binding cash constraint. This binding 
constraint prescribes that total cash available is less than total loans allowed by 
CAR. If M rises, then cash on the right hand side of cash constraint (3.19) becomes 
-
larger than P0 , which is feasible under the cash constraint. So the feasible set in 
Figure 3.5 is below the cash constraint. The same exercise can be done to the 
CAR constraint (3.20) with point B. A rise in M makes _the right hand side rise , 
confirming that the number of loans cannot be larger than the allowed maximun1 by 
capital regulation. So the feasible set in Figure 3.5 for a CAR constrained bank is 
also downwards. Putting both together, it means that if a bank is under constraint 
from both, then the feasible set of actions is in the area below both lines, denoted 
by the vertical shading. 
Proposition 2 The CAR constraint will only bind at any stage of bank liquidation 
if receipt from each case of sale is smaller than its write-off on the balance sheet. 
Proof. From Figure 3.5 , the CAR becomes a concern to banks if liquidation rises 
to beyond the intersection point of the two lines ( to the right of the graph). The 
two constraints will cross if the slope of CAR constraint (3.20) is smaller than that 
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of the cash constraint (3.19). That is: 
Rearranging, this condition becomes: 
(3.21) 
• 
The condition given in this proof says that when the receipt from a case of 
liquidation q0 k_ 1 (1 - c) is lower than its corresponding write-off l on a bank's 
balance sheet , then the CAR constraint will bind at some stage. This is because 
there is a net loss in capital for the bank, and generates a drop in its capital ratio. 
The asset price q0 under a binding CAR constraint is given in equation (3.17). 
Substituting into condition (3.21) given in Proposition 2, one finds that the con-
dition only holds when the expected payoff to liquidation is larger than that of 
rollover: 1r(l + i 1 ) > 8(1 + i 0 + i 1). Intuitively, this condition can be understood as 
a higher expected payoff to liquidation leading to more new lending, which increases 
the riskiness of banks and so brings the possibility that the CAR constraint binds. 
There is also a case where the CAR constraint is not binding at all , which occurs 
when the slope of the cash constraint is smaller than or equal to that of the CAR 
constraint. That condition boils down to q0 k_ 1 (1- c) ) l , which says receipts from 
each case of liquidation is equal to or larger than the write-off on the balance sheet. 
This corresponds to a case where 8(1 + i 0 + i 1 ) > 1r(l + i 1 ). It means liquidation 
results in a profit on the balance sheet , and will actually raise the capital ratio. 
This situation is represented in Figure 3.6. 
The marginal benefit of liquidation under the CAR constraint can again be 
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Figure 3.6: The CAR constraint never binds 
looked at from the expected revenue function. The total expected return to liqui-
dation is again 
and substituting for P0 l using the binding CAR constraint (3.20), the total benefit 
can be expressed as 
1r(l + i1) CR [z + (P- 1 - N)iol - Ml+ qoMk_1 (l - c) - CRlP_ 1 + CRMl]. 
Substituting for q0 with the asset price equation (3.4) and highlighting it with 
square brackets , the marginal benefit M BcAR with respect to Mis therefore: 
M B cAR (3.22) 
1r(l + i1) { [ A Eq1] ( _ ) _ (l _ )l} 
CR R(I-< - P_1k-1 + lv1k_ 1 - P0 k0 ) + R k_i l c CR · 
To compare what happens with the CAR constraint case against the cash con-
straint case in section 3.3.2 , it is useful to notice that co1npared to M B cas h in 
equation (3 .13), MBcAR has an additional -(1- CR)l term, but its effect is coun-
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Figure 3.7: Marginal benefit under CAR constraint 
teracted by the division by CR. To know which one is larger, one must consult 
the other conditions already established in this section. Recall that in constructing 
Figure 3.5, it is determined that the slope of the CAR constraint (3.20) must not 
be negative. This means q0k_ 1(1- c)- (1- CR)l ~ 0, so MBcAR is positive. 
Also, since q0k_1 (1 - c) ~ l , the CAR constraint will never bind, meaning only the 
cash constraint binds. Proposition 2 proves that a binding CAR constraint must 
Notice that with the above information, M Bcash in equation (3.13) can be ex-
pressed as q0 k_1 (1 - c)1r(l + i1). Since q0 k_ 1 (1 - c) ~ l for a binding cash con-
straint , lv1 Bcash ~ l1r(l + i1). The M BcAR expression (3.22) can be written as 
0
1R[qok-1(l - c) - (1 - CR)l]1r(l + i1) , but crucially, q0 k_1(1 - c) < l. Consider 
qok- 1(1- c) = l- c, c > 0. Substituting l-c into MBcAR gives (l- dR)1r(l+ i1). 
Hence it is clear that the marginal benefit in the cash constraint-only case is higher 
than the CAR case, because l1r(l + i 1) > (l - dR)1r(l + i 1). On a diagram, the 
marginal benefit line will hence be lower than in the cash constraint case, as shown 
in Figure 3. 7. 
The exact magnitude of liquidation that makes both the cash and CAR con-
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straint binding can be found by maximising the bank's problem under the relevant 
conditions , and then finding an explicit solution to M. Call this intersection M int· 
Under a regime of capital regulation, if the condition in Proposition 2 holds , and 
the level of liquidation chosen by banks is higher than Mint , then the capital ratio 
will present a binding constraint to the amount of new lending banks can engage 
1n. 
This gives rise to a situation of forbearance lending due to problems with declin-
ing bank health. It is so because when a bank's liquidation is constrained by the 
CAR, its level of liquidation is above Mint and it is not able to liquidate as much 
as desired by profit maximisation without CAR regulation. The CAR constraint 
only binds when the capital ratio is at the minimum CR. Since the capital ratio is 
a measure of bank health, it follows that the bank's health must have deteriorated 
to a point where liquidation cannot proceed any further. 
In other words , when liquidation rises to a certain extent , banks are forced to 
stop and forbear some bad loans due to declining bank health. Compared to the 
case without the CAR constraint in section 3.3.2, this is clearly forbearance of a 
different sort. Without the CAR constraint, banks choose how much to liquidate 
according to the trade-off between expected return on rollover and liquidation, and 
recycle the funds into new loans without any limitation. Any concious choice of 
forbearance is made with the purpose of profit maximisation, where all monies re-
couped from liquidation can be lent out. With the CAR constraint, it is conceivable 
that some bad loans are kept operative purely because it will cause too much harm 
to the bank's health if liquidated. In other words, CAR regulation introduces a 
non-monetary cost to banks by for1nalising bank health as an explicit consideration, 
on top of profits alone. As writing off bad loans damages bank health ( even if it 
gives longer term benefits in cleaning up bank balance sheets , allowing more new 
loans to be made) , it becomes more costly to write off such bad loans. This finding 
is in agreement with Peek and Rosengren (2005) who find that some Japanese banks 
were for bearing loans in the 1990s because writing them off would hurt them too 
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much. It also leads to the insight that the imposition of CAR regulation dampens 
the introduction of new demand into the land market. Its effect on asset prices is 
summarised in the next proposition. 
Proposition 3 If minimum capital requirements are binding on banks, then the 
asset price rises when such capital requirements are lowered and vice versa. If it is 
not binding, then there is no effect. 
Proof. See Appendix C. • 
By limiting the a1nount of liquidation and new lending, the impact of the CAR 
regulation on the land market will be reducing both the supply and demand of 
collateral, and preserving the existence of some old, delinquent firms. In this light , 
the CAR imposes a constraint on bank profit maximisation. It is hence an im-
pedin1ent to the 'recycling channel' of bank loans, curtailing its crucial support to 
. -
the land 1narket. As suggested by Pringle (1974) , Furlong and Keeley (1989) , Gen-
notte and Pyle (1991) and Diamond and Rajan {2000) among others , changes in 
capital regulation can result in banks changing their risk profiles. Along this line 
of reasoning, it is conceivable that varying the CAR countercyclically is a possible 
policy lever in managing the economy, and that is borne out in this model by the 
above proposition. See Goodhart (1995). For example, within the setup in this 
model all banks should operate at the minimum ratio CR for profit maximisation, 
so that in economic downturns , relaxing capital regulations increases the amount of 
liquidation and boosts the recycling channel in the economy, thus providing support 
to the land market . 
It must be highlighted that the result of Proposition 3, while mathematically 
confirming the use of a fluctuating CAR as a tool for economic management , does 
not provide automatic support for it. This is due to a number of other factors 
that make countercyclical manipulation difficult. As Rajan (2009) points out, in 
market downturns investors demand safety, so lowering the CAR may not lead banks 
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to respond with more lending. Equivalently, when markets recover after a bust , 
banks and investors alike will like less capital and more loans , putting up strong 
resistance to the idea of raising the CAR to its erstwhile level. The enforcement of 
such regulation may also lead banks to shift activity off balance sheet , to such bodies 
as structured investment vehicles (SIV), which are unregulated. The effectiveness 
of this kind of action is therefore different in economies with banks of varying risk 
profiles and appetites . See also Gorton and Winton (1995). 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that in considering the effects of bank actions in treating 
their NPLs , it is crucial that both the supply and demand side of asset markets 
must be considered. Contrary to suggestions that more liquidation must result 
in depressing asset prices, inclusion of the recycling channel of bank lending can 
bring in new demand which supports and may even raise asset prices overall. It 
is also shown that forbearance of NPLs can result from two sources , from normal 
profit maximisation as well as from declining bank health. It means that both 
polar opinions of asking banks to provide stimulus by either liquidating all bad 
loans swiftly, or to forbear them are not helpful. Not only may this bring banks 
further away from their natural profit maximising behaviour , it can also harm bank 
health by reducing their capital ratios. If the deviation from profit-maximisation 
and deterioration in health leads to problems in the banking sector , then the extra 
stimulus to the macroeconomy from more lending may be negated. 
The capital ratio is demonstrated to be binding on banks only at higher levels 
of liquidation. Larger negative shocks that generate more NPLs also allow the 
possibility for banks to liquidate more bad loans. They are hence more likely to 
be prevented from liquidating their NPLs by capital adequacy requirements. This 
linlitation is an impediment to the recycling of bank funds into new loans , reducing 
the support this gives to asset prices , and may allow lower resultant asset prices to 
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harm the economy. The constraint on cleaning delinquent loans is also associated 
with higher levels of forbearance. It does so by introducing a cost to the liquidation 
process in terms of bank health, and not through private profit maximisation or 
direct governmental intervention based on macroeconomic concerns. Movements 
in capital standards are demonstrated to have a negative relationship with respect 
to asset prices , which affirms the mechanics for using the capital ratio as a tool for 
economic management , notwithstanding the trade-off in weaker health for banks, 
and other problems with making this an active economic policy. 
Many simplifying assumptions are made in this model to emphasise the main 
messages. But there are a number of extensions which can yield interesting insight 
into explaining bank attitudes in dealing with bad loans. For example, liquidity 
risk is entirely omitted in this model, so banks in this model can lend until either 
cash is exhausted or if the minimum capital ratio is reached. For most banks in 
the world, this is not the case. By including the incidence of random shocks on 
the liquidity position of banks ( and not just on the profitability of its custo1ners), 
it further strengthens the importance of the cash position of banks, and is likely 
to induce banks to hoard liquidity, possibly reducing the strength of the recycling 
channel. 
There is also a question over whether banks will become more conservative after 
the arrival of negative shocks. To banks in this model, the firms ' probabilities of 
success are defined as exogenous, and decline after a shock hits a firm. But it may be 
the case that firm productivities are related to past performance in different ways , as 
may be appropriate for companies in different industries. This has the potential to 
alter the forecasts of banks over expected profitability, and change their decision in 
choosing how many bad loans to liquidate. Events in credit markets in 2008 suggest 
this maybe the case with firms in certain industries suffering more from a shortage of 
bank loans. It may also be because of the impossibility of forming precise estimates 
for the prospects of bank customers. If uncertainty is introduced into the forecasts 
of banks , then it is likely to cloud their profit maximisation activity. Given the 
74 
special value of safety to the banking sector , perhaps the market for bank loans 
will suffer from this increase in information asymmetry. The effect this has on the 
liquidation decisions of banks, though, is uncertain, since it is unclear whether it is 
safer to liquidate delinquent firms and hold cash as buffer, or allow some of them to 
continue operating at the expense of other firms about which banks have typically 
less information. 
The above point is also related to the issue of reputational effects. This can 
affect decisions with NPLs in two different ways: the public's perception of banks 
given firms ' past histories; and the reputation of banks in response to changes 
in capital regulation. It is quite possible that if a bank's financial statements 
show large amounts of delinquent loans ( or even just higher amounts of loan loss 
provisions), then it is construed by the public as a signal for financial hardship 
ahead , and leads to pressure on its management, even if they are not in any financial 
trouble. In this case, banks may decide on its liquidation action based on factors 
other than pure profit maximisation. 
Also important , particularly to regulators, is the public image of banks if CAR 
requirements are relaxed in economic downturns. While it allows banks to make 
more lending legally, they may also be seen as becoming less safe, which can mean 
banks are reluctant to take up the extra latitude afforded to them. This poses 
questions about the usefulne s of lowering capital ratios as a policy, as opposed to 
injection of capital into the banking sector. A notable case study is in the change of 
capital regulation in Japan in the 1990s to include deferred tax assets , which result 
from current losses , as Tier II capital. This action simply serves to raise the capital 
ratios of banks , without changing their financial performace or cash flow positions at 
all. To take these factors into account , relationships between perceptions of bank 
safety and expected return must be specified, and parameters such as perceived 
safety included in the objectives of banks. This issue is of particular importance as 
it can shed light on the effectiveness of policies aimed at helping banks in economic 
downturns. 
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Chapter 4 
Assessing the Strength of the 
Bank Lending Channel in 
Australia 
4.1 Introduction 
The bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission refers to a process by 
which the effects of monetary policy are transmitted to the_ economy through vari-
ation in the quantity of loanable funds. Depending on the financial position of 
individual banks, the amount of funds made available for bank lending can change 
as their cost of funding is affected by changes in the central bank's policy interest 
rate or regulatory changes.1 The most commonly cited example of a model of the 
bank lending channel is Bernanke and Blinder ( 1988). A functioning bank lending 
channel refutes the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem of perfect capital mar-
kets , because it relies on both banks and bank customers not being able to switch 
between sources of finance without costly effort. This can only be the case when 
the exchange of information is based on imperfect disclosure in the balance sheets 
of both banks and borrowers. 
1 Other main sources of funds for banks are to draw on deposits and issuing securities on the 
financial markets. Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) have shown that 
sn1all banks and those 'Nith less financial strength react more to changes in monetary policy. This 
gives support to the idea of imperfect capital markets , since otherwise all banks should be able to 
substitute into other sources of funds effortlessly and mitigate the effects of monetary policy. 
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The literature on the transmission mechanism has identified a number of possible 
ways through which monetary policy is transmitted. Among them, the traditional 
interest rate channel of monetary transmission suggests the main effect of 1nonetary 
policy is through affecting the demand side of the economy. In contrast, the 
credit channel is concerned with policy effects transmitting through influencing 
the aggregate amount of credit in circulation. Within it , the balance sheet channel 
considers the demand for bank loans being constrained by fluctuations in borrowers ' 
balance sheet positions, while the bank lending channel affects the supply of bank 
loans , influenced in turn by bank balance sheets. See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) 
and Bernanke and Gertler ( 1995). 2 
The condition of banking sectors around the world in the past few years provides 
a good case in point to demonstrate the effect bank balance sheets can have on the 
real economy. While the aversion of banks to making new loans in the last few years 
maybe out of concern for borrowers' ability to repay ( an observation sympathetic to 
the balance sheet channel of monetary tramsmission) , it may also be because banks 
themselves are constrained by declining financial strength or regulatory tightening, 
which can lead to a shrinking supply of loans. If that is the case, loosening monetary 
policy by si1nply cutting interest rates alone may not be effective as transmission 
through the banking sector is incomplete. This incomplete transmission happens 
because in the traditional interest rate channel monetary policy is discussed mainly 
in the context of stimulating aggregate demand, but if the extra high-powered 
money made available is simply hoarded by banks , then it may render such stimulus 
ineffective. 
As described in de Fontenay, Corbett , Grenville, and Henckel (2008), the finan-
cial crisis that started in 2007 is characterised by problems with market liquidity 
- the inability of banks to trade their assets at reasonable prices. 3 This leads to 
2 There are also some other channels through which monetary policy is transmitted , for example 
exchange rates , and wealth effects. They are not the main focus of this chapter. 
3 IVIark-to-market accounting rules enacted in the last few years also play a part in producing 
reversals in balance sheet positions , in that firms must value their assets according to latest prices 
much more frequently than before. When markets trend downwards, banks must recognise losses 
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declining 'funding liquidity' , a contraction in the volume of bank lending based on 
shortage of interbank market funds and weak bank health. As a response, there 
have been efforts to strengthen the health of banks by capital injection in an at-
tempt to relax banks ' financial constraints, which may lead to a larger supply of 
bank loans. Also , the policy of supplying funds to the banking sector through 
accepting a larger variety of bank assets as collateral can be understood as a way 
to reduce the cost of funding for banks.4 The reason such steps are taken to shore 
up the banking sector stems frorn a belief that bank loans represent an important 
source of funding to the general public. This belief ties in well with one of the 
conditions of the bank lending channel. 
The global financial crisis has also brought to light the importance of the in-
terbank market to the economy. Over the last decade, securitisation activity has 
greatly changed the way financial intermediaries fund themselves. As suggested in 
Adrian and Shin (2008), its increase has led to a new breed of broker-dealer insti-
tutions with business strategies that do not depend directly on the level of bank 
deposits. The important point, they suggest , is that these institutions maintain 
high levels of leverage for business purposes by drawing funds fron1 the interbank 
1narkets. Since commercial banks , with their large deposit bases , are active partici-
pants in the interbank markets , this phenomenon gives new importance to the bank 
lending channel. While broker-dealer intermediaries may have taken market share 
from the co1nmercial banks in supplying credit, they deal heavily with commercial 
banks , which themselves also participate in the securitisation process. Bank lend-
ing, in other words , is not only a potentially unique source of funding to businesses , 
but also to other financial intermediaries. 
As the bank lending channel is based on the imperfect exchange of information 
regardless of whether t hey have actually sold any of their assets. For a discussion of the challenges 
such rules raise to central banks, see Goodhart (2006) . 
4 In Japan in the 1990s, there have been policies to simply tolerate lower capital standards, 
through lax accounting measures and allowing 'evergreening' of non-performing loans by banks. 
These are more controversial because they do not help the overall financial health of banks. But 
broadly speaking, they can also be understood as methods to free banks from immediate pressure 
to contract their loan books. 
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between demand and supply of finance , there is a view that empirical work on the 
bank lending channel is most meaningful if done on commercial loans data, since 
at least some firms are big enough to be able to access capital markets without 
incurring prohibitive costs , providing a useful contrast to researchers. For example, 
in I{ashyap and Stein (2000) , the bank loan data used is from the 'commercial 
and industrial loans ' category. Huang (2003) finds that small non-listed firms in 
the UK bear the brunt of reduced bank loans related to contractions in monetary 
policy, and in severe tightenings , even the smaller listed companies which are usually 
more bank dependent than larger ones are affected. The typical mortgagee in the 
housing market , in comparison with firms , is without ready and cheap access to 
other sources of finance, and information asymmetry between providers and users 
of mortgages is much stronger. It is thus highly likely that the bank lending channel 
has a strong influence in the mortgage market , regardless of developments in the 
commercial loans market , as found in Iacoviello and Minetti (2008). If the impact 
of the bank lending channel is reduced for bigger firms compared to smaller ones , 
and the firms sector in general compared to households , then it raises the possibility 
that individual firms 1nay react differently to monetary policy. The degree to which 
monetary policy in Australia affects different firms through influencing the volume 
of bank loans is an interesting question that deserves investigation. 
The institutional features of the Australian banking environment provides rea-
son for one to believe the bank lending channel plays an important role in the 
economy. In a European cross-country analysis , Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-
Pages , Sevestre, and Worms (2001) list a number of factors , which give a broad 
indication of whether it is likely the bank lending channel has a powerful effect. 
To sunnnarise, the stronger a country is in each of the four areas below, the less 
sensitive bank credit is to monetary policy changes. Australia's relatively low score 
in each of the areas points to a strong influence being exerted by the bank lending 
channel: 
a) state influence in determining credit flows - after deregulation in the 1980s, 
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there is little interference from the government in the destination or volume of credit 
flows in Australia; 
b) relationship lending - this is not thought to be strong in Australia, and in 
countries with similar market structures ( the so-called Anglo-Saxon type of financial 
system); 5 
c) size of deposit insurance6 - previously there has been no deposit insurance 
scheme in Australia, but the Australian government implemented a guarantee on 
corporate and retail deposits and bank wholesale funding from November 2008 for 
a period of three years. While its scope had undergone changes since that date , 
a limited guarantee capped at A$250,000 had remained in force since February 
2012. 7 
d) extent of bank networks - it is generally believed that banking networks are 
not strong in Australia, even though the banking sector is concentrated in four big 
banking groups.8 But it should be noted that since deregulation in the 1980s, all 
Australian banks face open competition from overseas banks that are frequently 
many times larger , and that all banks can draw freely on international funding at 
world interest rates. 
An important point of note in the Australian case is that over a longer term 
horizon, there are reasons to suspect the mechanism of the bank lending channel 
may have changed, because of steps to deregulate the financial sector. Since the 
1980s, securities markets have developed rapidly, and Australian banks are able to 
5 Allen and Gale (2000) has an exhaustive survey of the features of different types of national 
financial systems and how relationship lending may be more prevalent in some of them. 
6 1\!Ioral hazard deriving from deposit insurance can possibly lead to more risk taking by banks , 
including 'gan1bling for resurrection ' behaviour. This means banks may ignore monetary policy 
and engage in more lending. 
7 For details of the scheme and changes made since, see official press releases at 
http: //www. guaranteescheme. gov. au / links/ . 
8 In 2008, there were signs that t he Australian banking sector had become more consolidated . 
Mergers include Con11nonwealth Bank's buyout of BankWest , previously owned by t he Halifax 
Bank of Scotland , Westpac Bank 's acquisition of RAMS home loans , and its subsequent 1nerger 
with St. George Bank. While some of the1n still operate with separate trademarks , it nevertheless 
raises the possibility of colloboration within the group. 
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invest and compete overseas. These changes have combined to make the traditional 
supply of funds for bank loans , the deposit base, less important. For example, the 
Australian dollar was floated in December 1983 and capital account regulations 
relaxed. In 1985, foreign banks were allowed to operate in Australia. Together 
these policies contributed to much foreign currency lending. In June 1985, foreign 
currency liability formed 4. 35 % of total bank liabilities and trended almost consis-
tently upwards to over 40% in 2006. This figure remained above 35% even when 
the global financial crisis started in 2007. 9 These policies enable banks to borrow 
overseas at different interest rates, so the notion that the supply of bank loans is 
influenced by a deposit base directly dependent on local monetary policy may need 
to be revised. Also , firms can more easily borrow from overseas debt markets. A 
result of the rapid development of the securities markets is that more loans can be 
generated by the financial sector. At the same time, more debt finance can be 
raised on the bond markets , in which banks themselves are also major participants. 
Given that Australia has persistent current account deficits , it is conceivable that 
the shortage of savings is mitigated by borrowing from foreign sources. More details 
on the Australian banking sector reforms can be found in Appendix F. 
For Australia, the development of securitisation activity has benefitted both 
the private debt markets and the banking sector, the growth of which have far 
outpaced that of GDP. In Figure ( 4.1), total commercial bank loans and private 
debt securities are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 10 The lower trajectory for 
co1n1nercial loans 1nay suggest a reduction in its importance to firms , but as shown 
in Figure ( 4.2), taken from Davis (2007), the ratio of stock market capitalisation to 
banking sector assets re1nains less than 100% in the past 30 years , while the stock 
of corporate bonds is very small throughout. The banking sector is clearly very 
important to the Australian economy. This phenomenon in Australia is similar to 
9 Author 's calculation. Data fr01n Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Statistics Table B3 and 
D3. 
10 Author 's calculation. Source: Nominal GDP data from International Financial Statistics 
series '19399.B.CZF. . . '; private bonds and commercial loans from Reserve Bank of Australia 
Tables D5 and D4 respectively. 
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Figure 4.1: Commercial loans and private bonds to GDP in Australia 
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other industrialised countries, where bank loans typically form a sizable part , if not 
the majority, of business finance. See Mishkin (2007). 
From the preceding discussion, two hypotheses related to the bank lending chan-
nel in Australia can be set out: 
Hl: foreign currency borrowing increases the supply of funds in Australia, thus 
reducing the financing limitations of firms that rely heavily on bank credit. In 
other words , the influence of the bank lending channel is weakened. 
H2: larger firms , which generally have more avenues of raising funds , tend to be 
less affected by the bank lending channel. 
Because of its importance to monetary policy, in recent years a multitude of 
studies were done on different countries to try to measure the bank lending channel. 
To date, the only study on the bank lending channel for Australia is Suzuki (2004) .11 
It investigates whether this channel 'dominates ' when compared to a traditional 
interest rate channel. A separate finding shows foreign currency liabilities to be 
11 An article published by the Reserve Bank of Australia (Grenville (1995)) on t he monetary 
transmission mechanism in Australia only briefly mentions credit rationing as a possible factor in 
affecting credit aggregates , without elaboration. 
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Figure 4.2: Ratios to bank assets (Davis 2007) 
0 ----~f-----+--+---+-----+-+--1--+--+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+----+--+--+--+----+--<0 
1 n(rT 
.l.7 ' . . ! 2001 2(1)7 
an important source of supply of funds for Australian banks. -However , while it 
establishes the relative importance of the bank lending channel, the finding that it 
does not dominate gives no indication of what can affect its strength. As Angeloni , 
Kashyap, Mojon, and Terlizzese (2002) conclude in a study of the eurozone, while 
in some countries the traditional interest rate channel does tend to dominate, a 
functioning bank lending channel cannot be dismissed for many in the sample, 
including large economies as Gern1any and Italy. 
The main contribution of this chapter is to add Australian evidence to the 
literature on studying the bank lending channel. This study complements the 
results offered by Suzuki (2004) by looking into the factors that can affect the 
potency of the bank lending channel in Australia using commercial loans data. At 
issue is how firms , regarded as more able to obtain market finance than the typical 
n1ortgagee, are affected by 1nonetary policy through changes in the volume of bank 
loans offered. The short run adjustment of the spread between bank loan rates and 
bond rates is examined to shed light on the strength of the bank lending channel. 
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If firms are able to switch between sources of finance easily, meaning the influence of 
the bank lending channel is weak, the difference in rates in the bank loan and bond 
markets should be very small throughout. Figure ( 4.3) plots the spread for three 
different loan series used in the estimations in this chapter. 12 In the graph, SA 
represents the difference between bank lending rates and government bond yields , 
while SB and SC refer to the difference between business loan rates below and 
above $2m respectively. It is clear from inspection that the spread is not constant , 
reflecting the fact that at different times the bank lending channel fluctuates in 
strength. 13 Analysis of these fluctuations can be of interest to banking authorities 
in Australia as it gives clues on possibly a different way in which firms react to 
monetary policy changes, and hint at the likelihood of success of policies designed 
to work through the bank lending channel. 
Due to problems in identfying what component of actual data on bank credit 
1s due to supply or demand for bank loans , most studies exploit the information 
contained in bank level data to uncover information on the bank lending channel , 
by looking at loan volumes from banks of different sizes and strengths. However, 
the number of banks in Australia is small, and most lending activity, in particular 
commercial lending, is dominated by the four big banks. Since one objective of the 
study is to investigate the reaction of commercial lending, this raises the question 
of not having enough observations to build a wide enough panel for analysis. In 
this chapter , the use of available aggregate time series data in Australia closely 
resembles that of the bloc of big banks due to the highly concentrated nature of the 
banking sector .14 The estimation strategy used here does not rely on identifying 
12 Author 's calculation. Source: bank lending rates for SA are obtained from IFS data series 
'19360P .. ZF . . . ' . Loans rates for loans below and above A$2m for SB and SC are both taken 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia Table D8. Iotice that due to potential differences in the 
method of calculating lending rates , the SA series constructed from IFS data show higher rates 
than RBA nu1nbers used for SB and SC for long periods of time. For a discussion of issues related 
to the loan rates data see section ( 4.4). 
13 As will be discussed in section ( 4.4) , five-year governn1ent bond yields are used as a surrogate 
for commercial bond yields and applied to the construction of SA, SB and SC. Commercial bond 
yields data do not stretch back far enough for purposes of analysis. 
14 For instance, a recent report states that the big four banks hold about 81 % of all outstanding 
home loans in Australia. Among new home loans written, their share is 93% to owner-occupiers , 
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Figure 4.3: Spread between bank loan and government bond yield. SA: Bank 
lending rate. SB: Business loans under A$2m. SC: Business loans above A$2m. 
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supply side factors in the bank loan market, instead the movements in price of 
alternative forms of finance: bank loans and bonds, are looked at from a macro 
point of view to see if they are materially different. A finding that the difference 
between these two rates fluctuates will lend credence to the view that the market 
for bank loans is separate from the market for bond finance, and that the influence 
of the bank lending channel changes as market circumstances change. Estimation 
results here will add to the stock of knowledge about the operation of this channel 
in Australia. 
In the rest of this chapter, section ( 4.2) examines the literature on the bank 
lending channel. The estimation method and data are introduced in sections ( 4.3) 
and ( 4.4). Results are discussed in section ( 4.5). Section ( 4.6) concludes. 
and an astounding 97% for property investors. See Sydney JVIorning Herald (2011). 
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4.2 Literature review 
Since Bernanke and Blinder ( 1988) outlined the theoretical foundation of the 
bank lending channel, many empirical studies have sought to measure it. Early 
studies, such as Bernanke and Blinder ( 1992), use the VAR method to see if different 
monetary measures and policy indicators had any relationship with a number of 
macroeconomic variables in the United States. Their results provide plausible 
evidence for a bank lending channel. But this kind of study which looks at the 
timing of changes in macroeconomic variables suffers from an identification problem 
because the effects of both the balance sheet of firms on the demand side and bank 
lending on the supply side are basically identical. 
There are two preconditions of the bank lending channel mentioned in Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) , namely that the supply of bank loans is affected by reserve 
balance requirements , and that some firms are not able to substitute from loans into 
other sources of funding costlessly. Both have been the subject of empirical tests for 
the bank lending channel. Kashyap , Stein, and Wilcox (1993) introduce the 'mix' 
variable, the proportion of bank loans in total firm finance , to test whether bank 
loans are more or less dominant for American businesses in episodes of monetary 
tightening. If effects of monetary policy operate only to influence aggregate demand 
in the economy, then firms should have no need to shift the makeup of their finance. 
In their study they do find evidence in support of a bank lending channel in that 
the proportion of finance obtained from the market rises as monetary policy is 
tightened. 
The problems for firms in obtaining finance are usually attributed to market 
imperfections. Due to incomplete information in credit markets, smaller firms 
frequently find that accessing market finance carries prohibitive costs . This ob-
servation is the main idea behind a study by Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) , who 
maintain that the findings of Kashyap , Stein, and Wilcox (1993) may be driven sim-
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ply by the heterogenous responses of firn1s that themselves have different degrees of 
reliance on bank finance. Specifically, small firn1s tend to rely more on banks for 
their financing needs , and are less able to buffer themselves than larger ones from 
contractions in credit. That alone, the authors argue, is enough to produce a drop 
in the fraction of bank finance in a monetary tightening. More generally, there is 
theoretical grounding to look at the possibly different responses to monetary policy 
changes from firms of varying sizes. A bank lending channel may be more influen-
tial for small firms than big ones. Empirically, apart from Huang (2003) discussed 
in the last section, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), with aggregate data in the US, find 
that s1nall manufacturing firms suffer much more financially than large ones when 
monetary policy is tightened. Vermeulen (2002), with data of four large European 
countries from 1983 to 1997, finds strong support for the view that smaller firms 
have problen1s with obtaining finance compared to larger ones. 
This line of reasoning, however, can also be applied to banks, and provide other 
hypotheses for testing. Kashyap and Stein (2000) assemble a very large panel 
of US bank data from 1976 to 1993 and look at whether banks themselves also 
face constraints in supplying bank loans. The idea behind this test is similar in 
spirit to firms - that banks also face problems with asymmetric information, and 
weaker ones find it hard to substitute between sources of funding. Their empirical 
exercise focusses on the effect of bank balance sheet conditions and bank size on 
loan supply. They find that monetary policy changes do induce changes in bank 
loans , and that small banks , particularly ones with less balance sheet strength, are 
affected more. The authors conclude that the bank lending channel is functioning. 
Even though they do not make precise quantitative measurements of these effects , 
it is nevertheless pointed out that they can potentially be substantial. 
Since the i1nplications of the balance sheet and bank lending channels with re-
gard to monetary policy changes are very si1nilar, it raises problems with identifying 
whether the observed effects are due to either channel. With Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) being the prime example, many studies seek to build panels of data to exploit 
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the different responses to monetary policy from banks of different sizes , and try to 
see if they exhibit the behaviour predicted by the bank lending channel. 15 The typ-
ical strategy is to estimate a particular rendition of the loan supply function based 
on the ideas laid out in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and the identification problem 
with bank loans data is solved if the panels include a large number of heterogeneous 
banks, since results can provide a useful contrast between banks of various sizes, 
states of health, market share, regions , and financial connections with other firms 
or banks. Some examples of such studies are Gambacorta (2001), Worms (2001) , 
Farinha and Marques (2001), Brissimis and Delis (2009), Golodniuk (2006), Haan 
(2001), Topi and Vilmunen (2001) and Takeda, Rocha, and Nakane (2005). They 
all conclude in favour of a functioning bank lending channel for the countries they 
study. 
Reflecting on the financial crisis that started in 2007, Freixas and Jorge ( 2007) 
present a theoretical model that looks at the inter bank market and tries to explain 
some empirical findings that have been difficult to understand. The model shows 
that the magnitude and liquidity effects of monetary policy can be rationalised by 
looking at frictions within the interbank lending market , which other earlier models 
assume to be completely efficient. This shows that the interbank market is not 
as efficient as first thought ( which is particularly true in economic downturns) and 
there is very likely to be a 'bank lending channel ' of sorts in operation as commercial 
banks are large and active participants in the interbank market. 
The evidence on Australia is scant. Studies that have looked into the trans-
1nission of monetary policy to the real economy typically only take account of the 
credit channel , without distinguishing between the balance sheet and bank lending 
channels. 16 Two attempts most related to studying the bank lending channel are 
15 The balance sheet channel is silent on the responses of individual banks. 
16 The Reseve Bank of Australia has made many studies down the years that make reference 
to the credit channel, but few make the distinction between a balance sheet and bank lending 
channel ,;vi thin it . See for example Stevens and Thorp (1989), Blundell-Wignall and Gizycki 
(1992) , Tallman and Chandra (1996), Brischetto and Voss (1999), Beechey, Bharucha, Cagliarini, 
Gruen, and Thompson (2000), Stone, Wheatley, and Wilkinson (2005), Berkelmans (2005) and 
imark (2007). 
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Suzuki (2004) and Tallman and Bharucha (2000). 
Suzuki (2004) suggests that if the reaction of bank loans to a tightening of 
monetary policy primarily comes from the bank lending channel, then overall loan 
supply should contract and loan interest rates should rise. The paper tests this 
hypothesis with data from 1985 to 2000, and concludes that changes in bank loans 
primarily work through a dominant interest rate channel. The reason is because 
in response to a rise in the policy interest rate, the price of loans drops. This drop 
in price reflects the drop in loan demand overpowering the tendency for price rises 
generated by the contracting supply of bank loans. In a separate estimation, total 
foreign currency liability is investigated. The author finds that foreign funding for 
Australian bank loans rises after monetary policy is tightened, implicating that the 
bank lending channel for transmitting contractionary monetary policy is mitigated 
by the inflow of funds. However, one potential problem with this study is that the 
price of loans is proxied by a diffusion index calculated from an Australian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry survey on the difficulty in obtaining finance. For the 
sample period (in fact the entire life of this survey which started in the 1960s), 
this index exhibits a regular upward trend, pointing to more difficult financing, 
and taken as higher loan prices in the estimation. This upward trend may reflect 
ongoing bias from the respondents, and makes this index an unsatisfactory proxy 
for the price of loans, since official interest rates have gradually fallen during that 
period. 
Tallman and Bharucha (2000) use data from the 1986 to 1993 credit cycle to 
investigate whether there was a credit crunch in Australia. Due to the lack of data, 
this study focusses on the direct observation of bank balance sheet information and 
builds its case on descriptive evidence. The authors argue there is weak circum-
stantial evidence that the supply side of credit was important in the recessionary 
period of the early 1990s, and banks that suffered more from NPLs had restrained 
credit more so than healthier ones. This suggests what Peek and Rosengren (1995) 
call a 'capital crunch' has happened to Australian banks in that period, lending 
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itself to arguments that a bank lending channel may be in operation. 
4.3 Empirical method 
The empirical approach taken here is based on analysing changes in the spread 
between bank loan rates and bond rates. The intuition derives from the structural 
model in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) that with the bank lending channel func-
tioning, then firms are only able to switch between bank and bond finance with 
some degree of difficulty. The implication is that the cost of looking for bank loans 
and issuing bonds are suffciently far apart. Studies that directly estimate the loan 
supply function have to rely on heterogeneous bank or firm level data to identify 
supply side effects, and thus to provide clues on the response of these entities to 
1nonetary policy changes. Due to the lack of data on individual Australian banks 
and firms , this study is not able to examine changes in the borrowing and lending 
behaviour of individual entities of different sizes and health. Instead aggregate 
data on variables implied by the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model are used in 
attempt to explain movements of the spread. 
That conditions in the Australian banking sector can be affected by economic 
policy, and in turn influence macroeconomic conditions is demonstrated by VAR 
studies in Suzuki (2004) and Berkelmans (2005). In the for1ner , it is demonstrated 
that deposits , loans as well as foreign currency liabilities all respond positively 
to innovations in the policy interest rate, and endogenously they have an effect 
on unemployment. In Berkelmans (2005), a counterfactual exercise finds that if 
unchecked by monetary policy, a 1 % positive impulse to credit volume in Australia 
can generate rises in output by up to 0.6% after one year. It also concludes that 
responses of credit volume and inflation are somewhat slow to changes in the policy 
interest rate. 
The specific version of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model suitable for Aus-
tralia must reflect the asy1nmetry between the bond and loan markets. It must 
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also describe the particular feature of the Australian banking landscape, that since 
deregulation in the 1980s borrowing from foreign sources acted as another source 
of funds for the banking sector, and had an increasing role in the Australian econ-
omy. The model starts with five basic equations, which can be reduced to a set of 
equilibrium conditions in the output and money markets and contains the spread 
between the bank loan rate and the bond rate. 
y = do - d1 i - d2 (p - i) 
where: 
L is log of real loans 
D is log of real deposits 
F is log of real foreign currency liabilities 
y is log of real output 
p - i is the spread between the bank loan rate p and the bond rate i. 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
Equations ( 4.1) and ( 4.2) describe the demand and supply of loans. Loan de-
mand is negatively related to the spread: a higher spread signifies a higher loan rate 
relative to bond finance , and higher output is associated with higher loan demand. 
The converse is true for the supply of loans: a higher loan rate induces banks to 
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make more loans available. Increases in deposits and foreign currency liabilities -
main sources of funding for banks - can also add to the loan supply. Equations 
( 4.4) and ( 4.5) describe the money and goods markets respectively. In equation 
( 4.4) , deposits are negatively related to the bond rate , because it reflects the cost 
of holding bank deposits, and positively related to income. With equation ( 4.5), 
production in the economy is dependent on access to finance , hence output is asso-
ciated negatively with bond rates. The interest rate spread is supposed to reflect 
imperfections in money markets , where some firms are not able to switch costlessly 
between obtaining funding from banks and the market. Such imperfections impede 
on the ability of firms to produce, hence a positive measurement reduces output. 
For example , a high spread reflects higher cost for loans relative to bonds , so firms 
that rely more on bank loans 1nust reduce producton and bring down output. Notice 
that if there is absolutely no difference between the bank loan and bond markets , 
then the spread will be zero. Here , total wealth, the interest rate for and level of 
deposits are assumed to be constant · and exogenously fixed. Since deposit interest 
rates do not affect the analysis , it is suppressed to zero. 
The empirical strategy involves estimating the loan supply function that results 
fro1n a reduced for1n of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model. This set of 
conditions is arrived at by using equations (4.1), (4.4) and (4.5). The equilibrium 
demand condition is fanned by taking equation ( 4.5) and substituting i and (p - i) 
a~ray, by using equations (4.1) and (4.4). 
From equation ( 4.1) , an expression for the spread is: 
and fron1 equation (4.4), the interest rate for bonds is found: 
Substituting the1n into the goods market equation ( 4.5) results in the equilibrium 
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demand condition, 
(4.6) 
The loan supply equation is simply equation ( 4. 2), rearranged so that the spread 
(p - i) is on the left hand side. 17 
where: 
go= (do - d1co/c1 - d2ao/a1)/(l + d1c2/c1 + d2a2/a1) , 
91 = ( d1/ c1) / (1 + d1 c2/ c1 + d2a2/ a1) , 
92 = (d2 /a1)/(l + d1c2/c1 + d2a2/a1); 
ho = -(bo / b1) , 
h1 = -(b2/b1) , 
h2 = l / b1 , 
h3 = -(b3/b1) , 
and: 
91 , 92 > 0 , 
(4.7) 
Finally, substituting D from equation ( 4.6) into the loan supply equation ( 4. 7) 
results in the representation used for estimation: 
(4.8) 
with: 
J. _ h _ h1go 0 - 0 91 ' 
17 This reduced form formulation is similar to the one employed in Brissimis and Magginas 
(2005). However , as will be made clear below, the estimation strategy here is different. 
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· _ h _ h1g2 
J2 - 2 91 ' 
)3 = h3, 
)l < 0, )2 > 0, )3 < 0. 
Due to some practical reasons, there is a chance a non-zero spread will be main-
tained ( either bank loans or bonds being more expensive) even without influence 
from the bank lending channel. Such problems may include differences in real life 
in the depth of the markets for bonds and borrowing from banks , the clientele these 
markets attract (such that a risk premium may be present), the possibility that 
regulations differ between markets , and from problems with gathering necessary 
and comparable data (such that a premium related to different term structures of 
securities comes into existence). However, variations in the difference between the 
loan and bond rates can signify a change in market conditions for bank loan and 
bond financing due to asymmetries between these markets. In other words, changes 
in the strength of the bank lending channel should lead to changes in the wedge 
that n1ay exist. Regressing movements in the spread through time with movements 
of the structural variables in equation ( 4.8) , in other words, their first differences , 
will give us an indication of the potency of this channel: 
(4.9) 
again with j 1 < 0, J2 > 0, j3 < 0. 
4.4 Data 
The data used in the estimations are quarterly measurements of log real GDP, log 
real deposits , log real bank loans , log real foreign currency liabilities of banks and 
the spread ( equal to bank loan rate - bond rate). Except for the spread, the series 
are discounted by the CPI. Since the literature has opined of varying difficulties for 
different firms or households to access finance from banks , it makes sense to estimate 
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with different categories of bank loans. In this study, aggregate series for total 
commercial loans and business lending under and above A$2m are used. The GDP 
data used are seasonally adjusted, but the others are not. Using seasonal dummies 
to run regressions for each of the dependent and independent variables , none of 
them display any seasonal pattern. Hence seasonally adjusted GDP data will be 
more appropriate for estimation as white noise introduced by seasonal patterns are 
avoided. For more details of the data sources, their time spans, and construction 
of the variables, please see Appendix E. 
The construction of the spread and loan variables requires some clarification. 
Given the consideration on this model is on the difference between firms obtaining 
finance from the banks and from markets, in constructing the spread variable the 
bond rate used should ideally be a corporate bond yield. However, reliable data 
on Australian commerical bond yields are only available from the Reserve Bank 
of Australia (RBA) from 2000 onwards. 18 To find a substitute, notice that there 
is reason to believe corporate bond yields track those of government bond yields, 
as many commercial bonds are indexed to the government treasury bill rate plus 
a risk premium. From year 2000 until the end of the estimation horizon in 2007, 
five-year government bond and commercial bond yields for AAA, AA and A graded 
firms are all highly correlated, with correlation coefficients at around 0. 95. 19 Since 
government bond yield data stretch much further back, it will be used as a proxy 
for commercial bond yield in this study. 
Different bank loan rates are used, where possible, to match the corresponding 
bank loan series as closely as possible. For example, as a proxy for large and small 
fir1ns , different rates are used for large and small business loans ( above and below 
A$2m in value). The aim is to compare what effects the bank lending channel 
has on different sections of the economy, for example larger businesses, which are 
18 There is also a problem with data reported by the Reserve Bank of Australia in that the 
categories of bonds issued change over time. It is thus difficult to construct a coherent series of 
data for estimation. 
19 Author's calculation. Source for corporate bond yields is Reserve Bank of Australia Table 
F3. 
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supposed to have easier access to capital markets. To match with total commercial 
loans, the spread variable SA ideally should be constructed using the loan rates for 
all commercial loans. Among the available sources of data, the 'bank lending rates ' 
series fro1n International Financial Statistics (IFS) is considerably longer than the 
RBA data, and for this reason is used for analysis. Notice that the IFS series 
mainly contains rates charged by banks on loans to large businesses , but the IFS 
does not give a definition of the size of the companies considered, nor the method of 
averaging to arrive at the rates. 20 The method of data collection and calculation is 
most likely different to the shorter series published by the RBA used in constructing 
spread variables SB and SC. An artefact of the different ways of calculating the 
loan rates is reflected in Figure 4.3 , where SA displays a trajectory higher than 
either the small or large business loans rates in SB and SC for the second half of 
the estimation horizon. Nevertheless , the fluctuations of all three spread series are 
very similar. 
The shorter RBA series also does not define a boundary between 'large ' and 
'small ' firms. There is however a division of business loans according to dollar 
amounts. Given the lack of access to data on bank loans of individual entities, the 
size of bank loans is taken as a surrogate for large and small firms , as large firms 
are likely to ask for larger loans. The highest category provided by the RBA, loans 
of A$2m or more, is separated from others below A$2m in an arbitrary partition 
in this study. Notice the A$2m demarcation is not adjusted for the price level 
throughout the series , so given persistent inflation in Australia since the start of 
the estimation horizon, this bar gets progressively lower in real ter1ns. As loans 
generally get bigger alongside prices over time, this series grows much faster than 
the under A$2m series. The loan rates data reported are weighted averages of fixed 
and variable rates loans. 21 
20 See International JVIonetary Fund (2011) . In any case, large businesses have more scope to 
ask for larger loans, so in any data series that purport to represent total business lending volumes 
or rates, one can expect the effects of loans to large businesses to dominate. 
21 The exact method as given by the R eserve Bank of Australia is that t he "'[w]eighted-average 
interest rates ' are calculated ... using the midpoint of each interest band [of 1%], except for the 
lowest and highest bands where half a percentage point is deducted and added, respectively. The 
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Due to issues with the availability of data, the regressions start at different 
dates and will be labelled in the results section. It was in February 1985 when the 
Australian banking sector deregulated and freedom to borrow in foreign currency 
granted. In view of the fact that foreign currency borrowing is such an important 
part of the Australian banking landscape, estimation should ideally start at this 
date. However , due to problems with finding adequate matching data on bank loan 
volumes and loan rates , this study takes 1990Ql as a start date when meaningful 
data on commercial loans is first available. 22 The end point for this study is 2007Q4. 
Bank loans series on large and small business loans only start in 1993Q4, but are 
still used on the premise of theoretical background. These time frames make 72 
and 57 observations available for estimation respectively. While it is best to have 
longer time series data to enlarge the san1ple size, the existing data should still 
allow estimation results to be trusted. 
In the last three decades , the Australian financial markets went through many 
-
changes, the banking sector itself was opened up to international competition, plus 
the economy underwent other disturbances. It is possible that these changes have 
altered the way the econo1ny functions , and the effects that roonetary policy has on 
the econoiny. 23 To see whether the estimations are subject to potential disturbances 
brought about by the changes in regulatory regime and economic environment, the 
Quandt-Andrews test is carried out on each estimated equation to examine the 
possibility of structural breaks. 
4.5 · Estimation results 
Estimation results for the four data sets are presented in Table 4.1. In all , estimation 
for three versions of equation ( 4. 9) are reported. The coefficients of the regressions 
calculation excludes impaired loans. 11 
22 The only bank loan rates series available from 1985 onwards is the one in International Fi-
nancial Statistics. However, commercial loan volumes data only start in 1990. There is no corre-
spondent bank lending rates series for total bank loans and advances data that is available from 
1985. 
23 See Appendix F for a discussion of such changes. 
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are reported in the columns and if significant at the 5% level, starred. A number 
of AR terms are included in each estimation to tackle the problem of serial correla-
tion and listed in the table. Correlograms are inspected and the Breusch-Godfrey 
test is carried out to ensure there is no problem. The numerous individual graphs 
and test statistics in this process are not reported here. P-values for the other 
diagnostic tests are reported: the Quandt-Andrews test is used to assess whether 
estimated equations contain structural breaks; the White test for heteroscedasticity 
is also reported, and where significant, White's heteroscedasticity consistent stan-
dard errors are used to assess the significance of the coefficients. Two fitted terms 
of the Ramsey RESET test are reported in testing for misspecification pro bl ems. 
As described in Section ( 4.4), in total three spreads are used. Respectively, 
they are: 
SA = Bank lending rate - 5-year government bond yield 
SB = Loan rates under A$2m - 5-year government bond yield 
SC = Loan rates above A$2m - 5-year government bond yield 
In each regression, the spread is run against the independent variables: change 
in log real output , change in log real loans, and change in log foreign currency 
borrowing. While there is reason to suspect these variables to be multicollinear in 
levels, their first differences do not share such concerns. None of the independent 
variables or their lags have correlation coefficients over 0.35, so there is no issue 
with multicollinearity in the estimations here. 
Table 4.1 reports a basic estimation with contemporaneous values , and other 
more parsimonious representations that may contain lagged values of independent 
variables. Lagged values are included because of the possibility of time lags in the 
effects of these variables on the spread. Since the estimation is essentially looking 
into imperfections in the market for external finance , it is sensible that such variables 
may take so1ne time to affect the spread. As quarterly data is used, estimations 
will take into account only the first lags - in financial markets two lags ( six months) 
is an implausibly long time for any influence of note to be considered. Notice that 
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with the equation of the output market ( 4.6), deposits and loans may be associated 
with output with a lag also. Since equation ( 4.9) contains the equilibrium in the 
output market as well , lagged deposits is also included (bank loan volume is itself 
already an independent variable of equation ( 4.9)). 
In Regression 1, total commercial loans are used against the dependent variable 
SA, and the time horizon starts in 1990Ql. This series of commercial loans in-
cludes bank loans to other banks, NBFis, un/incorporated companies, non-profit , 
government and private entities, and starts in 1990Ql.24 In Regression la, both the 
contemporaneous and lagged foreign currency liability are significant, as is lagged 
deposits, but other terms are insignificant. After dropping the insignificant out-
put and loan terms, in Regression 1 b both current foreign currency borrowing and 
lagged deposits are significant. Adjusted R 2 is almost the same even with so many 
dropped terms. Since the series for the independent variables are not multiplied 
by 100, the coefficient of 6depositt-l says that if the change in lagged deposits 
rises by 1 %, then the change in the spread will be negative 0.07759% (7. 759 basis 
points). In the context of the model employed here, this is in line with the idea 
that larger deposits should depress lending rates and eventually reduce the spread. 
A narrowing spread points to the bank lending channel reducing in strength, as that 
is an indication of less asymmetry between the bank loan and bond markets. Even 
though it is smaller in magnitude compared to lagged deposits, the coefficient for 
6FC Lt is positive, contrary to theory. The results indicate a positive rise in the 
change of foreign currency borrowing widens the spread by about three and a half 
basis points. This may n1ean that instead of increased foreign currency borrowing 
relieving the pressure on bank loan rates instantaneously and hence depressing the 
spread, this increase coincides in timing with rising demand for bank loans , so the 
estimation picks up a rising spread together with rising foreign currency borrow-
ing in the financial system. This suggests foreign funds take time to affect the 
Australian financial markets. 
24 See Appendix E for more information. 
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Table 4.1 Regressfon Resu Its 
Regression 1a lb le 2a 2.b 2c 3a 3b 3c: 
Start of time horizon:. 1990Q1 1990Q1 1990Q1 1993Q4 1993Q4 1993Q4 1993Q4 1993Q4 1993Q4 
Dependent v:ari ab[e: SA SA SA SB SB SB SC SC SC 
In.dependent variables:. 
40utpUtt -3_695 -1.07"1 --2.268 
LM..oan1: 
Bank loans 
Commercial tending 0.841 
Bus.in ess. lending under A$2m -1.907 
Bustn ess lending .above A$2m 2.002 
llFCLt 4_523* 3_486* 2_-694* 3.465~ 3.682* 2.965* 3.582* 3.283* 3.146* 
~utp-ut1-1 11_085 17 _453~ 18.181* 
iQ..Oepositt-1. -10-624* -7-759~ -11.-637't' -7.134* -9.698* 
&oant-1.: 
Bank loans 
Commercial I ending 2_278 
Bus.in ess. lending under A$2m 0.728 
Bus.in ess. lending above A$2m -1.565 -2;861* 
AFClt-1 -2-955* -2.-519* -1.435 -.2 . .242* -9.6-98* -2.164* 
AR terms included 1r2.,3.,4 2"4 4 2A 2r4 2_..4 1r2r3r4 2"4 2.,3.,4 
Adjusted R;z, 0_295 0_272 0,241 0.256 0.371 0.299 0.407' 0.262 0.337 
Quandt-Andrews ·test 1_000 1.000 0_990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.965 1.000 
White.~s test 0_978 0 ~523 0_838 0.353 0.007* 0.106 0.359 0.833 O.l.57 
Ramsey RESET ·test.: ' 
1 fitted term o_s.20 0_337 0,259 0.563 0.468 0.917 0.423 0.915 0.674 
2 fitted tenns 0_636 0_412 0,120 n/a 0.345 0.212 0.444 0.487 0.21-6 
Definition of Spread: SA ={Bank lending rate - 5 yr government bond yield)-; SB ={loan rat.es under A$2m - 5 -yrgovernment bond 
yield); SC -={loan rates above A$2m - 5-yr govt bond yiefd). The start of the estirnat:ion horizon Js -indicated-for each -regression, 
they aH end in 2007Q4. A :star indicates significa:rn:e at the 5% level for regression coefficients ,of the independent variables. 
Values. reported for diagnostk tests are p-vaiues. Figures smaller than 0.05 i.ndic:ate rejection of the nuU. The ·White te.st is. 
for- het.eroscedas.Ucity., if the nu.U of homos.cedasticity is rejected., then White's Heteroscedastidty con:sistent error:s are used to 
assess significance. The Quandt-Andrews tes.t is f.or structural breaks,. with the null of no break i:n the-equation. Two fitted 
terms are used for the Ramsey RESET test for misspecifi<:ation, with rn/aj representing a test that cannot be-carried out. 
In Regressions 2 and 3, different series for bank loans below and above A$2m 
and their corresponding average lending rates are used for estimation. The time 
horizon is somewhat reduced and only starts in 1993Q4. Regression 2a includes 
contemporaneous and lagged terms of independent variables, and here current for-
eign currency liability, lagged deposits as well as lagged output are significant, and 
the bank loan terms are again insignificant. Similar to Regession 1 b , once progres-
sively dropping insignificant terms, Regression 2b finds '6.depositt-l and '6.FC Lt to 
be significant , with the same signs and even similar magnitudes. One suspects the 
same mechanism is at work with lagged foreign currency borrowing in this segment 
of the economy as in Regression 1: for small firms which borrow small amounts, a 
rise in deposits weakens the strength of the bank lending channel; meanwhile the 
rise in banks ' foreign currency borrowing coincides with pressure in the loan market 
and rising spread. 
Regression 3 is simply the above A$2m analogue of Regression 2. It is done to 
provide insight to the claim that large firms tend to have better access to capital 
markets, and have more options in raising finance ( which may include loans and 
bonds, as well as flotation in the stock market). That way, aggregate volumes 
in the bank loan market ought to have a smaller impact on such firms. With all 
terms included, Regression 3a finds current and lagged foreign currency liability, 
lagged deposits as well as output significant. However , further reduction results in 
Regression 3b, showing only '6.FC Lt and lagged loans '6.Loant-l to be significant. 
Moreover, both have signs that do not adhere to theoretical prediction. Contrary 
to Regression 2b, lagged deposits is not significant for large loans , and the negative 
lagged loans coefficient n1eans that when bank loans are growing, the spread will 
decline. A rise in the change of lagged loans by 1 % actually narrows the spread 
by 2.861 basis points. A plausible explanation may have to do with larger and 
more reputable firms obtaining more loans at lower rates. Perhaps that is due to 
banks preferring to increase lending to large firms at cheaper rates , at the expense 
of small loans which are mainly made to smaller firms. This result corroborates 
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with the finding in Huang (2003) that big firms get more credit at the expense of 
smaller firms. In any case, inspection of the large loans data reveals lending rates 
to be consistently lower than smaller loans. 
There is a trend in all three regressions that more foreign currency borrowing 
by the banking sector coincides with a widening spread in the same period. While 
that may be explained by banks responding to increasing tightness in the A us-
tralian loans market by in1mediately borrowing from overseas, it is interesting to 
see whether through the passage of time there is a reduction in the spread due to 
this borrowing. In Regressions la, 2a and 3a, ~FC Lt-l is negative after positive 
values are reported in the contemporaneous terms, but the lagged term eventually 
drops off as it becomes insignificant. Regressions le, 2c and 3c include only for-
eign currency liability and its first lag to give a clearer idea of the effects of foreign 
currency loans. All three results show that foreign currency loans are associated 
with a widening spread in the current period, but after one quarter it narrows down 
substantially. If it is admissible that foreign currency liability rises in tandem with 
bank loan rates reflecting a shortage of local funds in the bank loan market, then 
it seems that after one quarter the increased supply of loans does relieve pressure 
on this market. This interpretation suggests foreign sources of funding act as a 
pressure valve to the Australian banking sector after a lag, bringing down loan 
rates which are otherwise rising. In other words , the introduction of foreign fund-
ing reduces the strength of the bank lending channel after a period of time. This 
conclusion is in agreement with the finding in Suzuki (2004). 
Taking stock of all the evidence together , it seems that for Australia conditions in 
the banking sector , as measured by the structural variables suggested by Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) , nan1ely aggregates in output , deposits , loans and foreign cur-
rency liabilities, do affect the markets for bank loans and bonds differently. The 
positive association of contemporaneous foreign currency liability and the spread is 
almost entirely reversed after one quarter. As discussed in Batten (1997) , foreign 
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currency funding increases in line with the rising openness of the economy, so it is 
possible that given persistent current account deficits in Australia throughout the 
estimation horizon, foreign currency liability augmented the supply of funds , and is 
able to decrease lending rates after a delay, reducing the strength of the bank lend-
ing channel in the process. With total commercial loans, larger deposits are related 
to a narrowing spread, in accordance with theory that a bigger deposit base reduces 
bank loan rates. Small business loans share the same result. These point to the 
bank lending channel being stronger when deposits shrink. However , the segment of 
the market for large bank loans seems to operate with a different mechanism, with 
loans instead of deposits being a driver of the spread, and higher growth of loans 
lead to a narrowing spread. This trend lends itself to the interpretation that larger 
firms have better access to bank financing. Throughout the estimation horizon 
in the 1990s and 2000s , the growing economy seems to be related to a rise in the 
volume of large loans as well as a drop in lending rates compared to financing by 
bonds. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Over the past decade, many studies have been made about the bank lending 
channel in different parts of the world , to paint a better picture of how monetary 
policy is transmitted through the banking system in different economic and insti-
tutional environments. The evidence on Australia is not rich: the only previous 
contribution is Suzuki (2004). However , the result that the bank lending channel 
does not dominate the traditional interest rate channel in transmitting monetary 
policy cannot answer the question of how strong it is and what factors can influence 
its strength. This chapter is an Australian addition to the literature, and extends 
the evidence on a bank lending channel by making use of readily available macro 
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time series data. Since the 1980s, the Australian economic landscape has changed 
enormously from steps to deregulate financial 1nar kets and the banking sector, re-
sulting in large flows of foreign funding for both firms and banks. If markets are 
well developed and efficient, there should be very little difference between bank 
lending and market financing , giving bank loan volumes little role in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. There£ ore there should not be any movement in the spread 
between bank lending rates and bond rates as financial aggregates in the banking 
sector change. 
The contribution of this chapter is to test the strength of the bank channel in 
Australia, with a particular focus on the financing of firms. Given that markets 
are in general not efficient, the results here indicate that the strength of bank 
lending channel drops when the deposit base rises in real terms. The implication is 
that for the time period between 1990 to 2007, firm financing is likely affected by 
n1onetary policy through the volume of bank loans available. Also , the mechanism 
in operation is different between large and small loans , which loosely proxies for large 
and small firms. These findings may suggest that larger firms , which generally take 
out larger bank loans , are beneficiaries from more bank loans and at lower interest 
rates - a conclusion consistent with the notion that firms in general do not switch 
frictionlessly between bank loans and bonds , in particular smaller firms face more 
difficulty in obtaining finance. A perculiar feature of the Australian financial 
n1arket since the 1985 is the increasing inflow of foreign currency borrowing as a 
source of funding. In agreement with Suzuki (2004), this new source of funds is 
found to reduce the strength of the bank lending channel after a one quarter lag 
by closing down the spread between bank loan and bond rates. The relationship 
between 1nonetary policy and commercial loans is worthy of further research, as 
other authors also find results that deserve more investigation. For example, den 
Haan, Sumner , and Yamashiro (2007) find that in the US , when monetary policy 
is tightened, mortgage and personal loans respond negatively, but the volume of 
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commercial loans rise. 
It must be noted this study is simplistic in many ways. For example, with the 
simple formulation used in this chapter , it is possible that some of the macroeco-
nomic variables used as regressors may to some degree be endogenous. Potentially 
this can bias the results, but the usage of lagged independent variables here can 
go some way in addressing this problem. To extend the scope of this study, more 
disaggregated data on large and small firms can allow refinement of the estima-
tions in Regressions 2 and 3. More exhaustive evidence may also be obtained by 
building panels of individual bank responses, but this requires a larger number of 
banks. While information maybe be lost at the aggregate level, the fact that not 
that many banks operate in Australia mitigates this problem, in the sense that four 
large banks form the bulk of the banking sector. 25 
Due to problems with data, corporate bond yields are not obtainable and prox-
ies must be used for the estimations. Nevertheless, this study is able to provide 
indirect evidence that financial markets are not yet efficient, and to the extent that 
bank lending is a unique source of funding in environments without completely fric-
tionless markets , the bank lending channel reduces in strength when the deposit 
base becomes larger, and when more foreign funding is introduced. As results here 
point to different mechanisms working for large and small firms , future research 
may focus on uncovering more details on their dissimilarities. Further studies in 
th.is area may be able to benefit from the continued accumulation of bank and firm 
level data for panel estimation, or more reliable series of corporate bond yields data. 
Alternatively, sn1aller institutions , such as credit unions and mortgage finance com-
panies n1aybe included for estimation, extending the analysis to the mortgage and 
personal loans market. An extension to studying the bank lending channel may 
be to concentrate on the interbank market , since there is an increasing number of 
financial institutions that deal in this market for their funding. However , these 
25 It will especially be the case now since the fifth largest bank (St. George Bank) has merged 
with one of the big four , Westpac. 
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institutions are very much dependent on commercial banks participating in provid-
ing short term interbank funding. In this sense, bank loans take on a different 
importance to the economy. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Episodes of large negative shocks to the economy, like the bursting of the bubble in 
J apan in the 1990s, or the turbulent events on financial markets since 2007 give rise 
to lots of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking system, in the process raising 
awareness in the ways banks deal with them. NPLs has always been an important 
consideration for banks in their daily operations, since it relates ~o how much loss 
they may suffer, and to the quantity of bank loans supplied. One particular topic 
in t he spotlight is the impact on the macroeconomy given the way banks tackle 
their problem loans. Also important is the way monetary policy is transmitted 
through to t he banking sector to the macroecono1ny. Whether changes in official 
interest rates impact on the economy by influencing the demand for bank loans by 
consumers and businesses, or its supply through t he lending behaviour of banks, 
monetary policy cont inues to exert a heavy influence on the banking sector. 
5.1 Bank treatment of NPLs 
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate t he actions of individual banks in dealing with their 
NPLs. The aim is to make clear the incentives that each bank faces , so as to 
enhance understanding of the considerations t hat enter a bank's decision-making 
process. The main thrust is t hat bank behaviour in disposal of NPLs is independent 
of concerns to the wider economy. Opinions that only fo cus on macroeconomic 
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concerns - whether to dispose of NPLs slowly or quickly, are not always appropriate 
as guides to how banks should proceed. 
Chapter 2 uses a simple partial equilibrium framework to analyse the balance 
sheet of a typical bank, focussing only on profit maximisation and the capital con-
straint. By abstracting from the many factors that are outside the control of banks, 
the model provides a reason why banks in some circumstances choose not to adhere 
to either extreme opinion when dealing with bad loans. The results reflect that the 
comments which advocate either faster or slower write-off of bad loans are mostly 
not derived from the point of view of banks. Also, analysis of the capital ratio con-
straint reveals that to free banks from being constrained by capital requirements 
when clearing their bad loans , loan interest rates must be high enough to guarantee 
a good profit margin. The rationale behind this finding is that the capital adequacy 
ratio acts as a constraint to the disposal of NPLs, to a point where banks cannot 
dispose of all their loans even if it may be more profitable for them to do so. 
Two implications of the model are that the losses from writing off NPLs can be 
covered by a high enough loan interest rate, and when capital regulation is tightened, 
banks with healthier balance sheets will have less need to respond by shrinking their 
lending activities. Higher loan interest rates increase the profit margin of a bank, 
and as the amount of NPLs grows, the interest income needed to compensate for 
losses upon write-off increases. The same holds for banks with less capital: higher 
loan interest rates are necessary to cover for the potential shortfall in capital upon 
write-offs. Therefore, forbearance of bad loans become more frequent under low 
loan interest rate and/ or low bank capital ratio environments. When this insight 
is applied to Japan with its zero interest rate monetary policy, and generally low 
capital ratios among banks , it is clear why banks there dragged their feet with their 
NPLs in the 1990s. 
It is also demonstrated that banks that are stronger in capital position will not 
need to respond as much as weaker counterparts in case capital regulation get more 
stringent. Weak banks that barely satisfy the minimum requirements are forced to 
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forbear more loans since liquidation will result in losses that contravene regulations. 
Well capitalised banks thus have more scope to choose a level of liquidation that 
brings t hem closer to t heir point of maximum profit. This result fits well with the 
observation in J apan in the 1990s - lots of forbearance of bad loans in a banking 
system with generally low capital ratios and low profitability. 
In Chapter 3, once the analysis is extended to include interactions with collateral 
markets , many more insights are revealed. The most important finding is that by 
including t he 'recycling channel' of bank lending in the 1nodel, it is possible that 
asset prices rise as a result of selling repossessed collateral in the market , and 
economic activity is boosted. This refutes the common opinion that firesales of 
collateral will heap pressure on asset prices and generate negative wealth effects. 
While this result may appear to justify the opinion that NPLs should be liquidated 
as quickly as possible to provide funds for new businesses, that is not necessarily 
so , because banks t hemselves may forbear for two reasons. 
Another main finding of this chapter is that there can be two types of forbear-
ance lending. The results show that there may be an optimal level of NPLs on 
banks ' balance sheets due to profit maximisation alone, in -which case it is detri-
mental to eit her force t hem to dispose of 1nore or less NPLs. Any effort from either 
t he 'liquidationist ' camp or people who prefer a gradual restructuring to mitigate 
t he NPLs problem is therefore unlikely to be helpful for the banking sector , unless 
it explicitly takes account of t he profit motive of banks. The other reason for for-
bearing bad loans can be called 'healt h-induced forbearance', due to the losses from 
writing off impaired assets potentially putting banks in breach of capital regulation. 
This can happen if disposing of a bad loan generates a loss for t he bank. Notice this 
is not the same as what is called 'regulatory forbearance' in the literature, which 
refers to a governn1ent decision to tolerate more bad loans in the banking system 
because of its potential cost to t he overall economy. 
It is shown in t his chapter t hat different levels of t he capital ratio can lead to 
different amounts of recycled bank lending and hence have different impacts on 
109 
collateral prices. In fact, lowering the m1n1mum capital ratio requirement can 
increase asset prices. In the environment of this model, a lower capital requirement 
allows banks to free up more cash for new lending, allowing more new firms to 
enter the economy and therefore support asset prices. Notwithstanding practical 
difficulties in using the capital ratio as a countercyclical policy instrument, lowering 
the capital ratio does provide stimulus to the economy and asset market. 
The above result can be applied to the context of Japan in the 1990s. Japanese 
banks had large amounts of NPLs from the prolonged slowdown, and suffered losses 
that threatened the viability of many of them. The Japanese regulatory authorities 
responded by allowing deferred tax assets to be considered as part of the capital of 
banks. The effect of this action is to artificially boost the capital ratios of loss-
making banks, and is equivalent to lowering the capital requirement, so that they 
did not have to shrink their balance sheets. The support this action provides to 
the economy is in agreement with the conclusion from this model. 
5.1.1 Possible extensions 
The model employed here to look into the question of NPLs is partial in nature. 
This setup simplifies the analysis a great deal, so that focus can be given to the 
mechanics of how a typical bank will deal with its bad loans. While the models in 
Chapters 2 and 3 allow one to make inferences about how much NPLs to liquidate , 
resultant collateral prices and also the amount of bank loans supplied, an obvious 
issue that is of great interest is to find out the welfare cost to the economy when 
banks clear their NPLs. To do this may require the banking sector environment 
here to be incorporated into a general equilibrium framework. Doing so can al-
low policyn1akers to assess whether policies designed to help banks with the NPLs 
pro bl ems are useful. 
This model may also be extended to look into the issue of stability of banks. 
In the environment here, banks are precluded from operating below the minimum 
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capital require1nent. As a bank's capital ratio drops, its scope for liquidating bad 
loans progressively decreases, to a point where there is forearance of bad loans. If 
this environment is relaxed to allow for the bankruptcy of banks , then it introduces 
a new dimension to the analysis , in that NPLs can affect the econo1ny not just by 
how much banks decide to liquidate, but also whether the banks themselves become 
insolvent. Such a scenario is not uncommon in the world, as many banks are often 
affected by bad loans to a point where their existence is threatened. Introducing 
this element into the model will allow analysis of the effectiveness of policies designed 
to mitigate systemic crises. 
5.2 The bank lending channel in Australia 
In Chapter 4 an empirical exercise is undertaken to find out about the strength 
of the bank lending channel in Australia. The bank lending channel concerns the 
transmission of monetary policy into the wider economy. Since the banking sector 
is a very important part of the economy in directing savings into investment, and 
bank lending is such a major, indeed sometimes unique, sour_ce of funding for many 
borrowers, it is necessary to find out how the market for bank loans will be affected 
by institutional changes in the financial sector. Of particular interest is whether 
firms which have better access to financial markets are less affected by variations in 
the supply of bank loans. This kind of study is much needed as the institutional 
backdrop of the financial services industry has undergone many changes since the 
1980s.1 Changes include the process of deregulation which allow banks to compete 
internationally for business and to engage in financing activities overseas. Coupled 
with continued financial innovation, these changes have resulted in the securitisation 
of erstwhile illiquid assets , and sustained growth in foreign currency borrowing 
in Australia. These developments lead one to question whether the influence of 
the bank lending channel 1nay fluctuate , and if firms of different sizes are affected 
homogenously. 
1 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Appendix F. 
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This chapter attempts to provide a contribution to the bank lending channel 
literature by studying Australia. For Australia, there has only been one study 
that dealt with the bank lending channel. The Suzuki (2004) finding suggests that 
the bank lending channel does not dominate the traditional interest rate channel. 
But this finding is not able to shed light on the fluctuations in strength of the 
influence exerted by the volume of bank loans circulating in the economy. Due to 
the lack of bank level data to build a panel that will allow identification of the loan 
supply function , the methodology employed here seeks to examine the potency of 
the bank lending channel by looking at the interaction between the prices of bank 
loans versus prices of bonds. The results here add to the Australian evidence given 
in Suzuki (2004) by ascertaining that the bank lending channel reduces in strength 
when the deposit base rises and when there is a rise in foreign funding for local 
economic activity. Also , the influence of the bank lending channel is stronger for 
small business loans ( which can loosely represent smaller firms) than larger ones. 
Given the concentrated nature of the banking sector in Australia, the use of 
aggregate data for estimation is quite representative of the behaviour of large banks, 
as the big four banks dominate overwhelmingly. This is- particularly so when 
one considers commercial lending, as smaller banks tend to be more active in the 
n1ortgage market and less so in making co1nmercial loans. However , if there is not 
data from another group of sn1aller banks for comparison, panel methods used in 
some studies for other countries cannot be employed. Here, estimations are carried 
out on different categories of business lending to see whether there is a material 
difference between the movement of interest rates charged on bank loans and those 
of bonds. If financial markets are always efficient , 1neaning firms can substitute 
between these two sources of funding without too much cost , then there should not 
be 1nuch moven1ent in the difference between these two rates. A narrowing spread 
between these two points to relative ease in switching between sources of finance , 
in other words a reduction in strength of the bank lending channel. 
With a number of different bank loans series data, the main finding is that in 
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Australia the operation of bank lending channel seems to be different between large 
and small loans. Results show that in the market for small scale commercial finance 
below A$2m, a larger deposit base can reduce lending rates and hence the spread, 
but only after a time lag. However for loans above A$2m, it is the volume of loans 
that have a negative effect on the size of the spread. This difference may reflect 
that banks prefer to lend to larger and likely more reputable firms, and charge 
lower interest rates when doing so. Another finding of this study, which broadly 
agrees with the findings of Suzuki (2004), is that foreign currency borrowing, an 
increasingly important source of funds for Australian banks, is associated with a 
widening spread contemporaneously, but narrows it after a one quarter lag, and it 
holds true for loans of all sizes. This likely means bank loan rates are rising just 
as foreign funds enter the banking system. Further analysis reveals that after a 
time lag, the extra funds will reduce loan rates and the spread declines. On the 
whole, these results show that larger firms, borrowers that are supposed to have 
better access to market finance than smaller counterparts , are aff-ected less by the 
supply of loans. As well, foreign funding is an important factor that can reduce 
the tightness of funding, and hence the strength of the bank lending channel , 1n 
Australia for larger and smaller firms alike. 
5.2.1 Possible extensions 
In this study, the spread variable should ideally be constructed by taking bank 
loan rates and con11nercial bond yields, since the distinction is between bank loans 
and n1arket finance , and participants in financial markets are mainly limited to 
firms. This is not possible in Australia as corporate bonds data are inadequate 
to form a usable data series for analysis. The use of government bond yield as a 
proxy, while highly correlated with corporate bond yields, nevertheless may mask 
important intertemporal divergences between yields from bonds issued by firms of 
different credit ratings. Future studies may be able to gather more exhaustive data 
on corporate bond yields of appropriate maturity to carry out the estimation. A 
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better classification of large and small firms , even if only in aggregate, can shed 
more light on the different mechanisms affecting large and small bank loans , as 
results here and among other studies are not always reconciliable with theoretical 
prediction. Having micro data on individual firms and banks can enable data 
panels to be built and provide insight into how monetary policy affects entities of 
different size and strength in the market for bank loans. The small number of 
banks that dominate in Australia ('the big four') provides a mitigating factor to 
the usage of macro time series data to proxy for their behaviour in this thesis, but 
extra information may be obtained if bank level data can be collected for a larger 
number of banks for estimation. Data from more categories of bank loans may also 
be used to provide clues on how different classes of banks and borrowers react to 
changes in monetary policy. 
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Appendix A 
Explicit solution for endogenous 
variables in Chapter 3 
In section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3, a relation between M and P0 in equation (3.12) 
is found from first order conditions. The corresponding expression for the CAR 
constraint case is equation (3.18). Solutions to variables in the bank's problem can 
be determined by using equations (holding with equality) for: 
the firms sector (3.1), 
loan size (3.2) , 
and asset market (3.4) , 
Using equation (3.1) , an expression for k0 is found: 
- l 
ko = k + -. 
qo 
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Making use of expressions (3.11) and (3.17) for q0 , explicit solutions for k0 are 
found. 
Substituting the above into the loan size equation (3.2) gives an expression for 
Rl 
Eq1 = . 
ko(l - c) 
Using the asset price expressions that result from FOCs in equations (3.11) and 
(3.17), and using Eq1 above, one can find an expression that contains both M and 
Po: 
A l Qo = +---R(K - P_1k-1 + Mk_1 - Poko) ko(l - c). 
Finally, making use of the relevant first order conditions equation (3.12) or 
(3.18) which contain M and P0 with this asset price equation allows these two 
variables to be pinned down. Notice that the value of M can only be between 0 
and N. Should the values of exogenous paran1eters put M outside this range, then 
a boundary solution is imposed. 
The asset price q0 and quantity of land under investment k0 are determined in 
the 1narket in aggregate, and as such, the process to solve them involves making 
use of the demand function for land equation (3.1), and the supply function given 
by equations (3.2) and (3.4). But the crucial point is that the price and quantity 
of land under investment is determined by the collective actions of the banking 
sector. That n1eans the optimal M and P0 found in the bank's problem should 
be used in this system. Since these same equations have been used in the bank's 
maximisation, plugging them back in will simply result in expressions (3.11) and 
(3.17) for the asset price, if both M and P0 are interior solutions. If however the 
explicit solution of M is below O or larger than N , as determined by the exogenous 
parameters , then M must be set at ]\I[= 0 or M = N and used to find the values 
of Qo and ko. 
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Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1 in Chapter 
3 
Substituting l fro1n equation (3.2) into equation (3.1) , an expression for Eq1 can be 
found: 
Eqi = Rqo(ko - k). 
(1 - c)ko 
Putting this into equation (3.3) and rearranging gives: 
1 - C ko '( ) qo = R - · H J,( - P_1k-1 + Mk_1 - P0 k0 . k - cko 
In this environment , the an1ount of investment per firm, k0 , is only determined 
by qo in the budget constraint (3.1). However , because individual banks are too 
small to affect the asset price , their individual decisions on liquidation are made 
without internalising it. That means k0 is independent of M in the calculation of 
th d · t· 8 qo e enva 1ve 81111 . 
The derivative ~: is: 
8qo 1 - c k0 8H' ( • ) 8( • ) 8P0 
BM R k - ck0 8(• ) 8Pa aM· 
Note from equations (3 .12) and (3.18) that ~fJ > 0. 
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Also , BH' ( • ) < 0 from the 8(• ) 
assumption of the marginal productivity of the asset holders. As well , ~~~ < 0 
-
and l~c > 0. So the sign of this derivative depends on the sign of k - ck0 . If 
the transaction cost for liquidation, as a proportion of receipt is smaller than the 
proportion of downpayment in new investment, that is, c < k:, then iJ~ > 0. But 
if this cost is sufficiently large at c > f
0 
, then k - ck0 < 0 and the iJ~ becomes 
-
negative. That is the case because k represents the endowment of new firms 
previously not used for investment. Its entry into investment serves to compensate 
the loss from liquidation. 
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Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 3 in Chapter 
3 
Consider first the case when the CAR constraint (3.14) is binding. In this case, the 
asset price is expressed in equation (3.17). According to Proposition 2, the CAR 
constraint only binds when l - q0 k_ 1 (1 - c) > 0. Substituting the corresponding 
q0 into l - q0 k_ 1 (1 - c) results in: 
This expression can only be positive if n(l + i1) > 8(1 + i0 + i1). 
The partial differential of the asset price equation (3.17) with respect to mini-
mun1 capital requiren1ent is 
8qo 
8CR 
Z[8(1 + i0 + i1) - n(l + i1)] 
n(l + i1)k-1(l - c) 
Given n(l + i1) > 8(1 + i0 + i1), this expression must be negative. 
Now consider the case when the CAR constraint (3.14) is not binding. That 
means bank lending can go on until the cash constraint (3.8) binds. The asset price 
therefore equals qo = 1r(:l~~ii~
1
i({~c) , listed as equation ( 3.11) above. It is clear that 
changing the capital requirement will have no effect on bank behaviour if it does 
not become binding on banks. 
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Appendix D 
Proof of non-negativity of M 
equation (3.18) in Chapter 3 
• Ill 
The expression for Mis only sensible if it is positive. In the binding CAR constraint 
case, that expression is equation (3.18): 
IV!= n(l + i1)[z + (P-1 - N)iol - QB_l(P_ 1 + P0 ) }. 
-C R()(l + i0 + i1) l 
Since the denonunator is negative, a sensible result for M requires the numerator 
to be negative, which boils down to proving the term in square brackets [z + (P_1 -
N)i0l - CRl (P_1 + P0 )] < 0. 
A clue to proving this lies in the CAR constraint equation (3.14) , which in t he 
present case is binding: 
[z + (P-1 - N)iol] - M[l - qok- 1 (1 - c)] = CRl(P_1 + P0 ) - CRMl. 
Rearranging, it becomes: 
[z + (P-1 - N)iol] - CRl( P_1 + P0 ) = M[l - q0 k_1(1 - c)] - CRMl. 
The size of t he left hand side can be found by considering t he term [l - q0 k_ 1 (1-
c)J on the right. As shown in Proposit ion (3) and its proof in Appendix C, substi-
t uting in the corresponding asset price expression (3. 17) gives C Rl [ 1 - e~;:7,)')] 
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and n(l + i 1 ) > 8(1 + i 0 + i 1). Together they imply the following: 
0 < CRJ'vfl [1 - 8(1 + io: ii)] < CRlvfl. 
- n(l + i 1 ) -
It means the right hand side is negative, so [z+(P_ 1-N)i0 l_ 1]-CRl(P_ 1 +Po) < 
0 and the proof is complete. 
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Appendix E 
Datasets for Chapter 4 
E.1 Construction of quarterly time series data for 
this chapter 
The data used in the estimations involve different bank loan series, corresponding 
bank loan rates , and different time spans. For data which are reported monthly, 
the data points for March, June, September and December are used to construct 
the quarterly series. If data are reported quarterly, then tl?-e figures reported for 
each quarter are used for analysis. None of the series is seasonally adjusted. 
E.2 Data used for estimation 
A) Total commercial lending: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The data is taken from Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Bulletin Table D5. It 
is non-seasonally adjusted. 'Commercial lending' includes bank lending to other 
banks , NBFI's , trading companies , unincorporated, non-profit , government and pri-
vate entities for business purposes. It excludes securitisations . Between 1990Ql 
and 2000Q2, the monthly figures are averages of weekly information. After that , 
datapoints are end of month numbers. The series used is discounted by the CPI. 
The CPI series is taken fro1n RBA Bulletin Table G2. 
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B) Large business loans (above A$2m): 1993Q4 to 2007Q4 
Data for business loans is obtained from RBA Bulletin Table DS. It is non-
seasonally adjusted and reported quarterly. This category of loans is divided into 
different industrial sectors and also classified according to amounts. The data used 
in this chapter is the total across all sectors, and the highest category, those above 
A$2m, is considered large and taken as a proxy for lending to large firms. The 
series used is discounted by the CPI. The CPI series is taken from RBA Bulletin 
Table G2. As mentioned in the text (in section 4.4), the A$2m amount that divides 
this series with under A$2m is not adjusted for inflation. Without information on 
the sizes of individual loans, it is impossible to have a more precise representation 
of large loans. 
C) Small business loans (below A$2m): 1993Q4 to 2007Q4 
Similar to loans above A$2m, this series is obtained in RBA Bulletin Table 
DS. The series used is discounted by the CPI. The CPI series is taken from RBA 
Bulletin Table G2. 
D) Lending rate for large business loans (above A$2m): 1993Q4 to 
2007Q4 
The data is taken from RBA Bulletin Table DS. It is reported quarterly. 
The 'weighted-average interest rates on credit outstanding' is used to construct 
the spread variable in this chapter , and includes all variable and fixed rate loans 
but excluding impaired loans. The RBA records amounts of loans outstanding at 
different ranges of loan interest charged. The range of each bracket is 1 %. The 
weighted average is calculated using the mid-point of each range. The data is used 
to construct the spread variable SC in this chapter. 
E) Lending rate for small business loans (under A$2m): 1993Q4 to 
2007Q4 
Similar to lending rates for large business loans , this series is taken from RBA 
Bulletin Table DS. The data is used to construct the spread variable SB in this 
chapter. 
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F) Bank lending rate: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
This series is taken from International Financial Statistics, series '19360P .. ZF ... ' . 
As described in International Monetary Fund (2011), this rate is an average of rates 
on loans mainly to large businesses. However , a definition of what constitutes a 
large business is not given. From January 2007, it records the rate charged on 
standard housing loans. Absent a better measure of average rates for commercial 
lending with a longer horizon, this data series is used to construct the spread variable 
SA in this chapter, to be matched in estimation with the volume of total commercial 
loans .. 
G) Bond rates: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The data is taken from RBA Bulletin Table F2 (monthly). As mentioned in 
the text in Chapter 4, there is a lack of commercial bonds data that goes back far 
enough for the estimations. Hence the data series used here is the government 
bond yield. Data for 5-year and 10-year government bonds are available, but for 
loans to business the 5-year-maturity yields seem closer to reality as a proxy for 
business loans. The monthly average of the last month of each quarter is used 
in this chapter for constructing the spread. These averages- are the 'midpoints of 
predominant bid and offer quotations in each market ' . 
H) Consumer Price Index: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The data is taken from RBA Bulletin Table G2. The series for ' all groups ' 
is used. It is reported quarterly and not adjusted seasonally. The figures are 
used to discount the nominal arnounts of bank loans , deposits and foreign currency 
liabilities in this chapter. For details on how the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
calculates the CPI, please refer to Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009). 
I) Bank deposits: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The series is constructed by finding ( M3 - currency) and then discounting it 
by the CPI. See below for information on data on M3 and currency in circulation. 
J) M3: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
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The data is taken from RBA Bulletin Table D3. The non-seasonally adjusted 
series is used. As documented in the RBA tables , between 1985Q2 and 2000Q2, 
the monthly figures are averages of weekly information. After that , datapoints are 
end of month numbers. This series is used to construct the data for the deposits 
variable in the estimation. 
K) Currency: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The data is taken from RBA Bulletin Table D3 , and includes notes and coins 
held by the private sector ( excluding banks). The non-seasonally adjusted series 
is used. As documented in the RBA tables, between 1985Q2 and 2000Q2 , the 
rnonthly figures are averages of weekly information. After that , data points are end 
of month numbers. Along with M3, this series is used to construct the data for the 
deposits variable in the estimation. 
L) Foreign currency liability: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The data from 1989Ql onwards is taken from RBA Bulletin Table D3. Prior to 
that, up to 1986Q3, it is reported in Table C7, and between 1986Q4 and 1988Q4, in 
Table CS. The series used in this chapter is total liability denominated in foreign 
currency, and are not seasonally-adjusted. The monthly figure of the last month 
of each quarter is discounted by the CPI and used in this chapter for estimation. 
M) Real GDP: 1990Ql to 2007Q4 
The data is taken fro1n RBA Bulletin Table G 10. Reported quarterly by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics , it is seasonally adjusted and calculated as an av-
erage of the income, expenditure and production approaches. For details on how 
the data is collected, please see Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011). 
E.3 Variables in the estimations 
1) Log of real Deposits = (M3 - currency) / CPI 
126 
2) Log of real Loans = Bank loans / CPI 
3) Spread = Loan rate - bond rate 
SA = Bank lending rate - 5-year government bond yield 
SB = Loan rates under A$2m - 5-year government bond yield 
SC = Loan rates above A$2m - 5-year government bond yield 
4) Log of real Foreign currency liability = Foreign currency liability / CPI 
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Appendix F 
The Australian banking sector 
and development of securitisation 
F .1 The Australian banking environment 
Prior to deregulation in the 1980s, the Australian banking industry was heavily 
-
guided by governmental decree. Interest rates were limited by arbitrary ceilings 
and banks had to hold particular kinds of securities. As well, the number of banks 
in existence and their lending policies were also dictated by the government. This 
represents an environment very different to the banking sector today. A full account 
of the Australian banking environment at t he time is contained in the government 
report named A Pocket Full of Change (Martin (1991)). 
Such regulation distorted the banking sector and reduced the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. It constrained banks ' growth relative to other financial companies , 
and gave rise to the opening of many non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), which 
were not regulated but were frequently owned by banks. That way, the importance 
of bank lending dropped and it reduced the efficacy of monetary policy. It made 
banks uncompetitive and the incun1bent set of regulations somewhat redundant. 
See Hunt and Terry ( 1997). 
Regulatory reforms started in the early 1980s in Australia with the release of 
the Campbell Report in 1981 (Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial 
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System (1981)) , the first such inquiry since 1937, recommending the removal of 
regulatory controls to be replaced by market-oriented forms of intervention and 
floating the Australian dollar. The recommendations are seen as promoting the 
role of market-based discipline ( see Jens en ( 1986) and Jens en ( 1988)). 
Following this report , in December 1983 the Australian dollar shifted from a 
fixed peg to a floating regime. In February 1985, foreign banks were allowed to 
operate in Australia under local licence and could compete directly with local banks 
( see Tyree and Weaver (2006)). Foreign currency borrowing rose dramatically as 
a result. A few months after the banking sector deregulated, foreign currency 
liabilities was 4.35% of total bank liabilities in June 1985, but stood at a peak of 
42.31 % in December 2006 , and while abating somewhat, still remained above 35% 
throughout 2007 .1 These large numbers reflect the increasingly internationalised 
nature of banks' operations that can potentially reduce the impact of local monetary 
policy, in favour of international credit conditions. 
In 1993, the Reserve Bank of Australia changed its main tool of monetary policy 
(Stevens (1999)). It went from manipulating monetary aggregates to using the 
interest rate to target inflation, like much of the western world at the time. From 
that time onwards , Australia's inflation rate has steadily dropped and has remained 
at a low level, si1nilar to the experience of other OECD countries. 
The Wallis report released in 1997 (Committee of the Financial System Inquiry 
(1997)) recom1nended completely dismantling the 'six pillars policy', allowing the 
four major banks (ANZ, Conunonwealth, NAB and Westpac) and the two big insur-
ance con1panies (AMP and Colonial) the chance to merge. This was only partially 
accepted by the government , which retained a 'four pillars policy', preventing the 
four big banks from engaging in any cooperative conduct. Ostensibly the govern-
ment opined that allowing the four big banks any chance to merge would result in 
a behemoth that would dominate the Australian market , creating a monopolistic 
1 Author 's calculation. Data from Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Statistics Table B3 and 
D3. 
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environment instead of fostering competition. This is despite arguments by the 
big four and sections of the public that a larger Australian entity will allow it to 
compete better for international market share, and the fact that a merged entity 
between any two of the big four will still be dwarfed by the world 's largest banks. 
See Reuters ( 2008). 
F.2 Securitisation and bank lending 
One effect of deregulating the banking sector and financial markets in Australia is 
that over time, financial institutions have found new ways to conduct their business 
and developed new profit centres. As a result, banks in Australia have regained 
market share from the NBFis. The development of a vigorous market for financial 
securities means debt financing is not any more the only way of raising funds. 
This has resulted in the emergence of many specialised institutions entering the 
market engaging in the trade of such instruments, and banks increasingly developing 
securities trading as a major activity alongside traditional lending. 
Despite the advantages deregulation has given banks over NBFis, Edey and 
Gray (1996) suggest there are other new sources of competitive pressure for banks, 
namely that of NBFI's ability to offer some intermediation products without having 
to supply the full set of banking services. So to some extent, the level of competition 
in the Australian banking sector is tighter than meets the eye. This may suggest 
the influence of bank networks in Australia is not as strong as first appears , lending 
support to the bank lending channel exerting a considerable influence on the market 
for bank loans. In particular, the subsequent growth of securities markets has made 
deposits a less important source of funding for financial institutions that seek to 
provide intermediation services. This points to a changing role of bank loans in 
the 1nonetary transmission mechanism. 2 
2It must be noted that the new demand for funds has in turn expanded the interbank lending 
market. To the extent that monetary policy can affect interbank lending, bank loans may still 
play an important role in transmitting official policy. 
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Technological innovation has at the same time reduced the cost of obtaining 
information on the market. The increase in bank securitisation of loans into finan-
cial instruments and offering to the market is hence mirrored by a similar increase 
in participation by retail and institutional traders ( which ultimately sell to retail 
customers). The quick dissemination of information on the internet has lowered 
the cost of trading, and may serve to lower an economy's reliance on bank finance, 
reducing information asy1nmetries. Also important are steps taken by account-
ing and financial market regulators to ensure timely disclosure of better financial 
infonnation by companies, and cooperation between Australian and international 
regulators to harmonise disclosure requirements. 
As a result, market-based financial activities have rocketed. The number of 
listed companies on the Australian stockmarket has grown steadily, from 1136 at the 
end of 1990 to 1988 at the end of 2007, a rise of 43%.3 The market capitalisation of 
domestic companies listed in Australia, as a percentage of GDP, has jumped from 
136% to 529% in the meantime. This is a big increase with average compound 
growth rate of almost 15%, compared to just over 6% in nominal GDP, meaning a 
larger number of co1npanies are now able to use equity for finance, instead of having 
to rely on bank borrowing.4 
The result of deregulation for banks is reduced market concentration of banking 
activity in Australia. Before foreign competition was introduced in 1985, many 
NBFis in the 1960s and 1970s were owned by banks, in effect allowing the banking 
groups to dominate. Parallels can be drawn with the experience of many European 
countries in the same period. For example, in a study of the Portuguese banking 
sector , which opened to foreign competition and also relaxed banking regulations 
in the 1980s and 1990s, Ferreira (2007) alluded to the subsequent continuous fall in 
interest rates in the 1990s as a reason for the enormous rise in bank credit. The 
falling trend in interest rates is perhaps also because of the competition from foreign 
3 Source: World Federation of Exchanges. 
4 Author 's calculation, data sources fron1 International Financial Statistics , Reserve Bank of 
Australia Bulletin Statistics Table Fll , and also World Federation of Exchanges. 
131 
banks, as a result of Port ugal having joined t he European Union. 
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